by her master or owners, she is made answerable to the laws of the place. Nor, if her master or crew, while on board in such port, break the peace of the community by the commission of crimes, can exemption from the local laws be claimed for them. But the comity and practice of nations have established the rule of international law, that such vessel, so situated, is, for the general purpose of governing and regulating the rights, duties and obligations of those on board, to be considered as a part of the territory of the nation to which she belongs. The local authorities, therefore, have a right to enter on board a foreign merchantman in port, for the purpose of enquiry universally, but for the purpose of arrest only in matters within their ascertained jurisdiction. It therefore follows, that, with respect to facts happening on board which do not concern the tranquillity of the port, or persons foreign to the crew, or acts committed on board while such vessel was on the high seas, are not amenable to the territorial justice. All such matters are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which the vessel belongs. So firmly is this doctrine incorporated into the practice of nations that the French regard it as a positive rule of international law, and the French laws do not hesitate to prescribe that, when crimes are committed on board a French vessel in a foreign port, by one of the crew against another of the same crew, the French consul is to resist the application of the local authority to the case.'

§ 27. It may be stated, in general terms, that the judicial power of every sovereign State extends: Ist. To all civil proceedings, in rem, relating to immovable or real property within its territory; 2nd. To all civil proceedings, in rem, relating to movable or personal property within its territory; 3rd. To all mixed actions, relating to real and personal property within its territory; 4th. To all its public and private vessels on the high seas, to its public vessels and their prizes in foreign ports, and, in certain cases, to its private vessels in

1 Webster, Dip. and Off. Papers, pp. 85, 86; Massé, Droit Commercial, tome ii. §§ 31-44; Legaré, Opinions of U. S. Atty's. Genl., vol. iv. p. 98; De Clercq, Formulaire, tome i. p. 366; tome ii. p. 65; the Creole,' Com. between U. S. and G. B., p. 241; the Enterprise,' Com. between U. S. and G. B., p. 187; Hello, Revue de Législation, tome xvii. p. 143; Wirt, Opinions of U. S. Atty's. Genl., vol. ii. p. 86; Berrien, Opinions of the U. S. Atty's. Genl., vol. ii. p. 378.

foreign ports; 5th. To all controversies respecting personal rights and contracts, or injuries to the person or property, when the person resides within the territory, wherever the cause of action may have originated. In this class of contro

versies, the judicial power may or may not be exercised, according as is provided by municipal law. This general principle is entirely independent of the rule of the decision which is to govern the tribunal.

With respect to criminal matters, the judicial power of the State extends, with certain qualifications: Ist. To the punishment of all offences against its municipal laws, by whomsoever committed, within its territory; 2nd. To the punishment of all such offences, by whomsoever committed, on board its public or private vessels on the high seas, and on board its public vessels, and, in some cases, on board its merchant vessels in foreign ports; 3rd. To the punishment of all such offences by its own subjects, wheresoever committed; 4th. To the punishment of piracy, and other offences against the law of nations, by whomsoever and wheresoever committed.'

1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, pt. iii. chs. xviii.-xx.; Story, Conflict of Laws, § 530-583; Henry, Foreign Law, chs. viii. et seq.; Gardner, Insti tutes, pp. 1-37. The criminal jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England extends over British ships not only on the high seas, but also in foreign rivers below the bridges, where the tide ebbs and flows, and where great ships go, though at a spot where the municipal authorities of a foreign country might exercise concurrent jurisdiction, if invoked. Therefore a foreigner was convicted of manslaughter at the Central Criminal Court, committed on board a British vessel in the River Garonne in the French empire, about 35 miles from the sea, and about 300 yards from the nearest shore, within the flow and ebb of the tide; the conviction was held right, under the 4 & 5 Will. c. 36, § 22. (R. v. Anderson, 38 L. J. (M.C.) 12. A prisoner was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for larceny committed out of an English vessel lying in a river at Wampu in China, twenty or thirty miles from the sea; the prosecutor gave no evidence as to the tide flowing or otherwise at the place where the vessel lay; the judges held that the Admiralty had jurisdiction, it being a place where great ships go. R. v. Allen, I Mood, C. C. 494. See also R. v. Depardo, 1 Taunt. 26. See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 94, and 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96 as to trial of crimes committed on the high seas, in the British colonies or other places out of the British dominion, in which the crown has jurisdiction.

Chilian subjects were ordered by their Government to be banished to England. The master of an English merchant vessel lying in the terrtorial waters of Chili contracted to, and did, bring them to England. The master, on his arrival in England, was indicted and convicted of assault and imprisonment on the Chilian subjects. Held by the Court of Crown Cases Reserved that the conviction could not be supported for what occurred in Chilian territorial waters, but that the justification ceased when the line of Chilian waters was passed. Persons, whether foreign or British, on board an English ship on the high seas, out of any foreign territory, are as much amenable to English law as they would be on

§ 28. The power of a State over the person of the party guilty of, or charged with, criminal offences, is necessarily English soil. R. v. Lesley, Bell. c.c. 220. A foreigner was found guilty in England of manslaughter on board ship, several thousand miles from England, and two hundred miles from any land. The registered sole owner was an alien born, but described in the register as of London, merchant; and the ship sailed under the British flag. As there was no evidence that the owner had been naturalised or had obtained letters of denization, it was held that there was no evidence that the ship was British, and consequently that the prisoner could not be convicted in England of this offence. R. v. Bjornsen, L. & C. 545.

The liability of a shipowner for damage to a pier jutting out into the sea, but attached to the soil of a foreign country, was held to be governed by English law, not by the lex loci. The M. Moxham,' 33 L. T. 463.

Although a port is locus publicus uti pars oceani, it is also infrà corpus comitatus. Therefore, a robbery and assault committed by a pirate in an English haven is not piracy, for it is not committed on the high seas; and being within a county, it was, even before the 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, punishable at Common Law.

If any person, being a British subject, charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, or in any foreign port or harbour or if any person, not being a British subject, charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, is found within the jurisdiction of any court of justice in her Majesty's dominions, which would have had cognisance of such crime or offence if committed within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction, such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the case as if such crime or offence had been committed within such limits. 18 and 19 Vict. c. 91, § 21. It has been decided that the word "found,' above-mentioned, is to be construed found at the time of trial.' R. v. Lopez, 1 D. and B. C. C., 525.

If any British subject commits any crime or offence on board a foreign ship to which he does not belong, any court in the British dominions which would have had cognisance of such crime or offence if committed on board a British ship within the limits of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court, shall have jurisdiction in the case; 30 and 31 Vict. c. 124, § II.

In the Statutes 24 and 25 Vict. c. 95, § 115; c. 97, § 72; c. 98, § 50; c. 99, § 36; c. 100, § 68, for the consolidation of the criminal law, provisions are contained, by which the indictable offences which shall be committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England or Ireland, shall be deemed to be offences of the same nature, and liable to the same punishments, as if they had been committed upon the land in England or Ireland.

Any offence against the British Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90, may be described in any indictment or other document relating thereto, as having been committed at the place where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be averred generally to have been committed within her Majesty's dominions, and the venue or local description in the margin may be that of the county, city, or place in which the trial is held.

The 26 and 27 Vict. c. 35, after reciting that the inhabitants of certain 'territories in South Africa to the southward of the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude are not within the jurisdiction of any civilised Government, and that crimes and outrages are likely (unless prevented) to be com-. mitted within such territories by British subjects, provides that the laws which are now or which shall hereafter be in force in the colony of the VOL. I.

limited to the extent of its own territory, or to the high seas which is the common territory of all, or to its vessels in foreign ports; for no sovereign State is bound, unless by special compact, to deliver up persons, whether its own subjects or foreigners, charged with, or convicted of, crimes under the laws of another country, upon the demand of a foreign State or its officers. The extradition of persons charged with, or convicted of, criminal offences affecting the general peace and happiness of society, is voluntarily practised by most States, where there are no special compacts, as a matter of general convenience and comity. Some distinguished jurists have Cape of Good Hope for the punishment of crimes therein committed, are thereby extended and declared applicable to all British subjects within any territory in Africa, being to the southward of the twentyfifth degree of south latitude, and not being within the jurisdiction of any civilised Government, and that every crime or offence committed by any British subjects within any such territory shall be cognisable in the courts of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, or of the colony of Natal, or of any British possessions in Africa to the southward of the said twenty-fifth degree of south latitude. Section 2 empowers the Government of the Cape of Good Hope to address commissions to persons to act as magistrates in such territory. And by Section 4, nothing, in the said Act, is to invest Her Britannic Majesty with any title to sovereignty over such territory.

By 29 and 30 Vict. c. 87, it is lawful, by order in council, made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 6 and 7 Vict. c. 94, and 28 and 29 Vict. c. 116, to assign to, or confer on any court, in any British possessions out of the United Kingdom, any jurisdiction, civil or criminal, original or appellate, which any order in Council might assign to or confer on any court in any country or place out of the British dominions, within which Her Majesty has power or jurisdiction, and further to make provision respecting the enforcement and execution of the judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences of any such court, and respecting appeals therefrom.

The 9 Geo. IV. c. 31 was repealed by the 24 and 25 Vict. c. 95. It is doubtful whether, under this statute, a foreigner was indictable in England, as principal or as accessory, for an attempt to assassinate abroad (R. v. Bernard, 1 F. and F. 240; and see R. v. Helsham, 4 C. and P. 394). A foreign sailor was indicted in England under this statute for stabbing and killing a shipmate on shore at Zanzibar; the death took place on board. The offence was held not to be within the statute (R. v. Matton, 7 C. and P. 450). But a British subject was convicted, under this statute, of the murder of a foreigner out of the Queen's dominions (R. v. Azzopardi 2 Moody C. C. 288). See also R.v. Sawyer, R. and R. 294, under the 33 H. VIII., c. 23, and the 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100. A prisoner was indicted in England under 24 and 25 Vict. c. 97, § 42, for conspiracy to destroy a foreign merchant ship. It being admitted that the prisoner was a party to the scuttling on the high seas, the jury were directed to consider whether the prisoner was a party in England to a previous plan to destroy the ship, the principal offence not being triable in that country. R. v. Kohn, 4 F. and F. 68.

The venue of indictments for high treason, or misprision of treason committed out of England, may be laid in the Queen's Bench, or in such shire as the Queen may appoint, if she appoint a commission to try the

treated this question as a matter of strict right, and as constituting a part of the law and usage of nations. Others, equally distinguished, explicitly deny it as a matter of right. The weight of authority is in favour of regarding it as a matter of comity, rather than of strict right, under the rules of international law as universally received and established among civilised nations. If it be regarded as a right at all, it is one of those imperfect rights which cannot be enforced, as the obligation on the other party is also imperfect, and not universally, even if generally, admitted.1

offender.-35 H. VIII, c. 2, § 1; 5 and 6 Ed. VI., c. 11, § 6. Treasons committed in Ireland or Scotland since the Union, or in Wales, are not within the 35 H. VIII., c. 2; but treasons committed in the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, Sark, and Alderney, or in British foreign plantations, are, although they are parts of the dominion of England, but not parts of the realm. See further Coke, Inst. 3 & 4.

1 The law founded on the comity of nations has been that offences which tended to the destruction of society or government, such as treason, were subject to punishment everywhere, and that the ruler of that State where the guilty party fled to had a right of prosecuting him. And it has been argued that since in matters of commerce subjects of one State could sue their debtors in another State, a fortiori, Princes who had received injury had a right to require the punishment of the evil-doer. - Weyer's case, 5 Jac. in B.R., Rolles abridg., fol. 530. See further Moore v. Kaye, 4 Taunt., 34; East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. sen. 246.

But a Prince, or one who has been contending for sovereign power, has been held exempt. The King of Scotland refused to deliver up Perkin Warbeck to Henry VII. (who had claimed him as a person not protected by the law of nations), saying that he, the King of Scotland, 'for his part, was not competent judge of Perkin's title, but that he had received him as a suppliant, protected him as a person fled for refuge, espoused him with his kinswoman, and aided him with arms, upon the belief he was a prince, and therefore he could not now, consistently with his honour, negative, and, in a sort of way, put a lie upon all that he had said and done before, as to deliver him up to his enemies.'-See Lord Bacon, Hist. of Henry VII. fol. 176.

Edmond de la Pool, Earl of Suffolk, being attainted by Act of Parliament in the twelfth year of Henry VII., fled to Spain. The King of Spain continuously refused to deliver him to England, but eventually did so, on receiving the promise that the Earl should not be put to death.

In 1173 the ambassadors of the Abassines were treacherously slain by one of the Templars at Jerusalem. On demand being made to deliver up the offender, the Grand Master absolulely refused to do so, but added that he had prescribed penance to the culprit, and ordered him to be sent to the Pope.-Tyrius, lib. 20, cap. 23.

Some Florentine merchants having been appointed collectors and receivers of the King's customs and rents in England, Wales, Ireland, and Gascony, fled to Rome, carrying some of the money which they had collected with them. King Edward II. sent his letters of request to the Pope to desire that they might be arrested and their persons and goods seized, and sent to England to satisfy the loss which he had sustained, promising, nevertheless, that they should not lose limb or life. The Pope seems to have acted as requested.-Rott. Romæ, n. 4, E. 2, m. 17, Dorso.