that the argumentum ad patriam would not prevail; at all events, it cannot be doubted that it ought to prevail, and should the country relying upon such authority be compelled to resort to arms, that the guilt of the war would rest upon the antagonist refusing to be bound by it.' 1

§ 28. Express compacts between States, and treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, declaring, modifying, or defining the rules which regulate their mutual intercourse, furnish another fruitful source of international law. Such treaties and conventions are of binding force only upon the contracting parties, and they cannot modify the original and pre-existing law of nations to the disadvantage of those States which are not direct parties to these compacts; but where they relax the rigour of the primitive law in favour of others, or furnish a more definite rule of practice in matters which have given rise to conflicting pretensions, the conventional laws thus introduced are not only obligatory upon the contracting parties, but constitute a rule to be observed by them toward the rest of the world. And although one or two treaties, varying from the general usage and custom of nations, cannot alter the pre-existing international law, yet an almost perpetual succession of treaties, establishing a perpetual rule, will go very far toward proving what that law is upon a disputed point.2

§ 29. Thus the consent of several nations, evidenced by treaties, to adopt a particular interpretation of a particular term, is, in the absence of other testimony, strong evidence that such is the true international meaning belonging to it. It is true that no treaty between two or more States can affect the general principles of international law, or directly prejudice the interests of others, though it may do so indirectly by positively declaring the interpretation to be given to a doubtful term, and thus laying down a principle binding, on them at least, in their intercourse with the rest of the world. This doctrine is laid down with great precision by Lord Grenville in his speech in the House of Peers, on the convention with Russia in 1801. We adopt Sir R. Phillimore's synopsis of the

1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i., § 60; Triquet et al. v. Bath, 3 Burr. R., pp. 14-80.

2 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, part i. ch. i. § 12; Heffter, Droit International, §8; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. i. tit. ii. ch. ii. ; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. i. ch. v.

part relating to contraband of war. He argued that, by the language of that convention, a new sense, and one hitherto repudiated by Great Britain, with respect to contraband of war, would be introduced, so far at least as Great Britain was concerned, into general international law; inasmuch as some provisions of the treaty, with respect to what should be considered contraband of war, were merely prospective, and confined to the contracting parties, England and Russia, while other provisions of the same treaty were so couched in the preamble, the body, and certain sections which contained them, as to set forth, not the concession of a special privilege to be enjoyed by the contracting parties only, but a recognition of one universal pre-existing right: they must be taken as laying down a general rule for all future discussion with any power whatever, and as establishing a principle of law which was to decide universally on the just interpretation of the technical term contraband of war?1

§ 30. State papers, and diplomatic correspondence between statesmen distinguished for their character and learning, frequently contain much valuable information respecting the particular points and questions of international law which are discussed by them. And perhaps these discussions exhibit the views and opinions of particular States more correctly than the compacts or treaties which may result from them, as such conventions are always more or less the result of compromise or temporary necessity. Moreover, these documents sometimes contain important admissions of what is, or ought to be, the law on points not immediately involved in the conflicting pretensions which have given rise to such discussions. The diplomatic correspondence growing out of particular negotiations may, therefore, very often be referred to with profit, in the investigation of questions connected with the rules of international law established by the consent and usage of nations.2

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, part iv. ch. iii. § 29; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 42; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates,-1801.

2 Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, p. 749.

58

CHAPTER III.

SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES.

1. A Sovereign State defined-2. A State distinguished from a_nation or people-3. A colony or dependency is a part of a State-4. But not itself a State-5. Mere fact of dependence does not destroy sovereignty -6. Nor occasional obedience and habitual influence-7. Nor feudal vassalage and paying tribute-8. They may impair or destroy sovereignty-9. Effect of a protectorate-10. Effect of a union of several States-11. A personal union of states-12. A real Union13. An incorporate Union-14. A Federal Union-15. When a mere confederation-16. When a composite State-17. Semi-sovereign States-18. Sovereignty, how acquired-19. Identity not affected by internal changes-20. A State involved in Civil War-21. Independence of a revolted colony or province-22. Recognition of such Independence-23. State Sovereignty, how lost-24. Changes of Government-25. Change by internal revolution-26. By dismemberment of a part-27 By division of one into two or more separate States-28. By the incorporation of several States into one.

§ 1. A STATE is a body politic, or society of men united together for mutual advantage and safety. Such a society has affairs and interests peculiar to itself, and is capable of deliberation and resolution; it is therefore regarded as a kind of moral person, possessing a will and an understanding, and susceptible of rights and obligations. From the nature and design of such a society, it is necessary that there should be established in it a public authority, to order and direct what is to be done by each individual in relation to the end and object of the association. This political authority, whether vested in a single individual or in a number of individuals, is properly the sovereignty of the State. This term, however, in international law, is usually employed to express the external rather than the internal character of a nation, with respect to its ability or capacity to govern itself, independently of foreign powers. A sovereign State may, therefore, be defined to be any nation or people organised into a body politic and exercising the rights of self-government.'

1 Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. i. cap. i. § 14; Vattel, Droit des

§ 2. A State is distinguishable from a nation or a people, since the former may be composed of different races of men, all subject to the same supreme authority. Thus, the Austrian, Russian, British and Ottoman empires are composed of a variety of nations and people. So, also, the same nation or people may be subject to, or compose, several distinct and separate States. Thus the Poles are subject to the dominion of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, respectively; and the Italians constitute several distinct and independent sovereignties. The terms nation and people, however, are frequently used by writers on international law as synonymous with the term States.2

§ 3. The sovereignty of a State has reference to its political character, rather than to the nature of its territorial possessions. The territory of some States is in one compact body, like Prussia, Bavaria, and Belgium, in Europe, Mexico, and the United States, in America, while the territory of other States, like that of Great Britain, consists of detached parts situate in every quarter of the habitable globe. Under the general appellation of State are included all the possessions of a nation, wheresoever situated, so that a colony, however distant, is, in the eye of international law, as much a part of the State which establishes it as is a city or province belonging to its most ancient territory.3

§ 4. As a colony, a possession, or a dependency, constitutes only a part of the State, it cannot in itself be regarded, in international law, as a distinct political organisation. Hence, any public or private corporation, created by, and deriving its authority from a State, cannot of itself constitute a separate and independent sovereignty. Thus, the East India Company, although exercising the sovereign powers of peace and war, with respect to the native princes and Gens, liv. i. ch. i. § 4; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. i. ch. ii. § 12; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome iv. pt. i. ch. iv.; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, §§ 16–19; Garden, De la Diplomatie, liv. i. § 3; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. i. ch. i. § 1; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 16-25; Merlin, Répertoire, verb. 'souveraineté.'

1 But this is so no longer, since the unification of Italy in 1860.

2 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 65; Rayneval, Int. du Droit Nat.. liv. i. ch. iv.

3 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. xviii. § 210; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. i. p. 40; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. i. cap. iii. § 7; Heineccius, Elementa Juris Nat. et Gent., lib. i. § 231; Puffendorf, Jus. Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. cap. xii. §5; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. xxvii.

people, acted in subordination to the supreme power of the British empire, and was represented by the British Government in all its relations with foreign sovereigns and States.

§ 5. The mere fact of dependence, however, does not prevent a State from being regarded in international law as a separate and distinct sovereignty, capable of enjoying the rights and incurring the obligations incident to that condition. Much more importance is attached to the nature and character of its connection with other States, and the degree and extent of its dependence. Thus, many European States, which are still regarded as sovereign, do not exercise the right of self-government entirely independent of other States, but have their sovereignty limited and qualified in various degrees, either by the character of their internal constitution, or by the stipulations of unequal treaties of alliance and protection.1

§ 6. Nor is the sovereignty of a particular State necessarily destroyed by its mere nominal obedience to the commands of others, nor even by an habitual influence exercised by others over its councils. Thus, the city of Cracow, in Poland, with its territory, was declared by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, to be a perpetually free, independent, and neutral State, under the protection of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Although its councils were habitually influenced by these great powers, it was nevertheless regarded in international law as a sovereign State; and when, by the convention of 1846, it was annexed to the empire of Austria, the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Sweden protested against the proceeding as a violation of the Act of 1815, by which it was recognised as an independent State.2

§ 7. So, also, tributary States, and those subject to a kind of feudal dependence or vassalage, are still considered as sovereign, unless their sovereignty is destroyed by their relation to other States. Tribute, like that paid by the European maritime powers to the Barbary States, does not necessarily affect the sovereignty of the tributary; nor does the acknow

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, lib. i. ch. i. §§ 5, 6; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 77 ; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int. tome i. p. 104.

2 Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tome ii. p. 386; Kluber, Acten des Wiener Cong. b. v. § 138; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. i. ch. ii. ; De Cussy, Précis Historique, p. 7; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, §§ 19 et seq.