ledgment of a nominal vassalage or feudal dependence, like that of Naples to the Papal See, prior to 1818, necessarily impair the sovereignty of the vassal State. Its position in the eye of international law is not necessarily affected by its connections of this kind with others. The law regards the fact of sovereignty rather than the mere name by which it is designated.1

§ 8. But the character of a State may be legally affected by its connection with others, and its sovereignty will be considered as impaired or entirely destroyed, according to the nature of the compact, the extent of the influence exercised by the superior, and the obedience acknowledged or rendered by the inferior; no matter whether such condition results from political organisation or from treaties of unequal alliance and protection. If a State, in either of these modes, parts with its rights of negotiation and treaty, and loses its essential attributes of independence, it can no longer be regarded as a sovereign State, or as a member of the great family of nations. Its legal status is not changed by a loss of relative power, but by a loss of the essential attributes of independence and sovereignty-the right to exercise its volition, and the capacity to contract obligations.2

§ 9. The effect of a protectorate upon the sovereignty of a State must depend entirely upon the character and conditions of the protection afforded. No doubt, one State may place itself under the protection of another without losing its international existence as a sovereign State, if it retains its capacity to treat, to contract alliances, to make peace and war, and to exercise the essential rights of sovereignty. But these rights must be retained de facto, as well as de jure, for although a State may retain the forms of independence, if it be practically and notoriously governed by officers appointed by another State, and incapable of exercising its own volition, it will be regarded as a mere dependence of the governing power.3

1 Ward, Hist. Law of Nations, vol. ii. p. 69; Bynkershoek, Quæst. Fur. Pub. lib. i. cap. xvii.; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 30-31.

2 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. Rep. p. 146; The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters. Rep. p. 1; The U. S. v. Rogers, 4 Howard Rep. p. 572; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 820.

3 Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. i. ch. ii.; Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tome ii. p. 663; Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 5, 56–60; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. xvi. § 192.

§ 10. Two or more sovereign States may be united together under a common ruler, or by a federal compact; and it will depend upon the nature of this union or confederation, whether such States retain their separate sovereignty, notwithstanding this connection with others. If each separate State retains the essential qualities of independence, the right of will and judgment, and the full capacity to contract obligations, it will still be regarded as a distinct society or body politic, possessing the rights of sovereignty, and subject to its duties; but if it has lost these qualities by such union with others, either by becoming subject to their will, or by creating a new national power, of which it is only a component part, it can no longer be regarded, in the eye of international law, as a sovereign State, although it may retain many of its sovereign rights with respect to its confederates.1

§ II. A union of two or more States under a common sovereign is called a personal union, if there is no incorporation, and if the component parts are united with a perfect equality of rights. Thus, Hanover, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, were at one time subject to the same prince, but there was no dependence on each other and both retained their respective national rights of sovereignty. Sometimes the individuality of the State is merged by such personal union, (unio personalis,) and, with respect to its external relations, remains for a time in abeyance, but emerges again on the dissolution of the union and resumes its rank and position as an independent sovereign State.2

§ 12. A real union of different States, under a common sovereign, is where the several component parts are not only united under the same sceptre, but the sovereignty of each is merged in the general sovereignty of the empire, as to their international relations with foreign powers, although still retaining respectively their distinct fundamental laws and other political institutions. Thus the Austrian monarchy, prior to 1849, was a real union, composed of the here

1 Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, §§ 20-29; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. i. ch. ii. §§ 15, 16; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. i. cap. i. § 27; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 19-29; Merlin, Répertoire, verb souveraineté.'

Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 76; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. xxvii.

ditary dominions, the kingdoms of Hungary, Bohemia, and other States, each of which retained a separate sovereignty with respect to its co-ordinate States, but were component parts of the empire, with respect to their international relations with other powers. By the constitution of 1849 and the patent of 1851, a more central system was adopted, and provision was made for uniform municipal legislation.'

§ 13. An incorporate union is where several States are united under a common sovereign, and a common government and legislature, although each may have its distinct laws and a separate but subordinate administration. Thus the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland are incorporated into an empire, the sovereignty of each original kingdom being completely merged by their successive unions in the United Kingdom, which, in international relations, is regarded as a single State. There is no essential difference, in international law, between a real and an incorporate union of States, the sovereignty of the component parts being in both cases considered as completely merged in the new imperial sovereignty which results from such union.2

§ 14. Sovereign States are sometimes firmly united together by a federal compact, without acknowledging any common sovereign. This kind of union is perhaps less frequent among monarchies than among States which have a republican form of government. From the extremely complicated nature of these leagues or federal compacts, it is sometimes very difficult to determine how far the sovereignty of each nation is affected or impaired by the conditions or regulations of such union. These compacts are divided by publicists into two general classes, confederated States and composite States.

§ 15. By a confederation, or system of confederated States, we understand that kind of union, or compact, which does not essentially differ from an ordinary treaty of equal alliance. The resolutions of the federal body are enforced not as laws directly binding upon the individual subjects of each State, but upon each separate government which adopts them, and gives them the force of law within its own jurisdiction; thus

1 Annual Register, 1849, p. 317; Annuaire des Deux Mondes, 18523, PP. 541-545. Merlin, Répertoire, verb ‘souveraineté.'

leaving to each State the exercise of its own will and responsibility in its general intercourse with foreign powers.

The Swiss Confederation of 1815, established under the mediation of the allied powers, and guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna, has been regarded by some text-writers as a mere league or system of confederated States, not differing essentially from a treaty of perpetual alliance between independent communities, in which each member of the union retains its own sovereignty unimpaired. But as the Diet formed by the twenty-two cantons of Switzerland had power to regulate the tariff of frontier duties, to provide for the common protection, to support a common army, with the exclusive power of declaring war and concluding treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce with foreign States, it seems to us that, by this confederation, the essential qualities of State sovereignty were merged in the Diet, and that the sovereign power of each separate canton was greatly impaired, if not completely destroyed, so far as international relations with foreign powers were concerned.

The Germanic confederation, formed between the free cities of Germany, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and other German States, and having for its declared object the preservation of the internal and external security of Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the confederated States, left to each member the power of contracting alliances and making treaties with other foreign States, except with an enemy against whom the confederation had declared war, and provided that such treaties or compacts were not directed against the security of the confederation or the individual States of which it was composed. It may be doubted if subsequent changes in this Germanic constitution have not materially impaired the sovereignty of the smaller States.

The confederation of 1778, between the United States of North America, was nothing more than a system of confederated States. The difficulty of enforcing the laws and regulating foreign affairs of the government led to the adoption of a Constitutional Union.1

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. i. ch. ii. §§ 21-25; Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 447 et seq.; Story, On the Constitution, b. ii. ch. iii.; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. pp. 212 et seq.; Hamilton, The Federa

§ 16. A composite State, or supreme federal government results from a grant of supreme federal powers to the government of the union, with the consequent limitations imposed upon the separate governments of the several compact States. Each separate State may retain its own legislature, and its distinct laws and administration, and its separate sovereignty may still subsist internally in respect to its co-ordinate States, and, in respect to the supreme federal government, in questions of power not expressly granted to it; but in all external relations its sovereignty is completely merged and destroyed.

The union of the United States of America, by the federal constitution of 1787, is regarded, in international law, as a composite State, or supreme federal government. So, also, of the Republic of Mexico, both as a confederation of States, and as a more central organisation under the departmental system.1

§ 17. Semi-sovereign States are those which do not possess all the essential rights of sovereignty, and which, therefore, can be regarded as subjects of international law only indirectly, or at least in a subordinate degree. Such States must generally, in war, share the fortunes of their protector, and in peace, must have his consent to the engagements they may desire to form with others. But as they are, for certain purposes, and under certain limitations, to be dealt with independently of such protectors, it is necessary to regard them as distinct organisations. Such States are usually independent in their action, on mere questions of comity, such as the rights of strangers in their own territory, and of their own subjects in foreign countries.2

§ 18. The sovereignty of a State is acquired either at the origin of the civil society of which it consists, or when it separates itself from the community of which it formed a part, and assumes the rights and obligations of a distinct and independent political organisation. All questions with respect to the origin of States belong to the province of political philosophy, rather than to that of international law. As list, No. xv.; Heffter, Droit International, § 21; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. i. ch. ii.

1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. §§ 118 et seq.

2 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 78; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. i. ch. ii. § 13; Moser, Beiträge, etc., B. i. p. 508.