Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940

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Brookings Institution Press, 1 déc. 2011 - 700 pages
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Since 1945, the United States has manufactured and deployed more than 70,000 nuclear weapons to deter and if necessary fight a nuclear war. Some observers believe the absence of a third world war confirms that these weapons were a prudent and cost-effective response to the uncertainty and fear surrounding the Soviet Union's military and political ambitions during the cold war. As early as 1950, nuclear weapons were considered relatively inexpensive— providing "a bigger bang for a buck"—and were thoroughly integrated into U.S. forces on that basis. Yet this assumption was never validated. Indeed, for more than fifty years scant attention has been paid to the enormous costs of this effort—more than $5 trillion thus far—and its short and long-term consequences for the nation. Based on four years of extensive research, Atomic Audit is the first book to document the comprehensive costs of U.S. nuclear weapons, assembling for the first time anywhere the actual and estimated expenditures for the program since its creation in 1940. The authors provide a unique perspective on U.S. nuclear policy and nuclear weapons, tracking their development from the Manhattan Project of World War II to the present day and assessing each aspect of the program, including research, development, testing, and production; deployment; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and defensive measures. They also examine the costs of dismantling nuclear weapons, the management and disposal of large quantities of toxic and radioactive wastes left over from their production, compensation for persons harmed by nuclear weapons activities, nuclear secrecy, and the economic implications of nuclear deterrence.

Utilizing archival and newly declassified government documents and data, this richly documented book demonstrates how a variety of factors—the open-ended nature of nuclear deterrence, faulty assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons, regular misrepresentation of and overreaction to the Soviet threat, the desire to maintain nuclear superiority, bureaucratic and often arbitrary decisions, pork barrel politics, and excessive secrecy—all drove the acquisition of an arsenal far larger than what many contemporary civilian and military leaders deemed necessary. Atomic Audit concludes with recommendations for strengthening atomic accountability and fostering greater public understanding of nuclear weapons programs and policies.

 

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Table des matières

Introduction
1
Building the Bomb
33
Deploying the Bomb
105
Targeting and Controlling the Bomb
197
Defending against the Bomb
269
Dismantling the Bomb
327
Nuclear Waste Management and Environmental Remediation
353
Victims of the Bomb
395
The Economic Implications of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence
519
Strengthening Atomic Accountability
545
US Nuclear Weapons Production Costs 194896
559
Selected DOD Nuclear Weapons Program Costs 196295
567
Nuclear Weapons Production and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Facilities
589
Assessing the Costs of Other Nuclear Weapon States
611
Steering Committee of the US Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project
617
Selected Bibliography
625

The Costs and Consequences of Nuclear Secrecy
433
Congressional Oversight of the Bomb
485
Index
653
Droits d'auteur

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Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 520 - In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
Page 519 - Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.
Page 520 - In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
Page 323 - Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top ... It's the dirt that does it ... if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it.
Page 152 - The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.
Page 319 - In the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved — if they can be warned to take shelter and // that shelter is available.
Page 76 - In determining not to proceed to develop the super bomb, we see a unique opportunity of providing by example some limitations on the totality of war and thus of eliminating the fear and arousing the hope of mankind.
Page 15 - The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,
Page xxi - A large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people. They will be asked to give up some of the benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms.

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À propos de l'auteur (2011)

Stephen I. Schwartz is a guest scholar with the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings Institution and director of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project.

Informations bibliographiques