ving no Resemblance to any other, and least of all to Local Motion.

AND, laftly, in external Senfations, in the Perception of Tafte, Smells and Sounds, that which we most immediately feel, gives us no Image, either of Matter or Motion. And when we fee external Objects by Images painted in the Eye, thofe Images can never be carried with an equal Motion, and in the fame entire Figure to the Seat of the Soul in the Brain, or in whatever Part or Region the Soul has its Seat and Perception is perform'd; nor can they more, when they are in Diforder and Confufion, reprefent the Object (by their own Force) diftinctly to the Soul. But we ought least of all to fufpect, that these Images, or Remnants of Images, are the very Thoughts themselves that arise from them in the Soul. And the fame Account is to be given of thofe little Images, which we may call Memorial Marks, which are very imperfect, and therefore unequal to their original Types. Laftly, if there are befides any other Thoughts, that may be referr'd to this Clafs, you will find upon inquiring into them, that they include nothing extended, or figured, or corporeal.

THUS far have we treated of the first Operation of the human Soul, which is call'd fimple Apprehenfion, whether it be a pure and abftracted Idea, or join'd together with Motion in fome Part of the Body. But

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there are in us, befides Ideas or fimple Appre henfions, fuperior and nobler Principles, or Faculties of the Soul, as Judgment, Reason, and a Chain of Reafons link'd to one another; and, laftly, there is a fovereign Principle that prefides over all these, and therefore is justly call'd by the Greeks, Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, & τὸ ažovalov. This fovereign Principle has Dominion and Empire as well over the Operations of the Soul, as over the Motions of the Body: And all thefe are to be feparately weigh'd, when we fearch into the Nature of the Soul. Let us proceed then, if you please, to a feparate Examination of each of them. The Operations of the Scul then, as we said above, following each other in due Order, are divided into fimple Perceptions, into Judgments, into Ratiocinations, and, if you please, into Methods, or into a Series of Thoughts that are marshall'd in exact Order; for Method comprehends and difpofes of feveral Ratiocinations. Ratiocination is employ'd in the Connexion of feveral Judgments, Judgment in comparing and comprehending feveral Ideas, or feveral Senfations. Thus if you proceed in Order, the Ideas are the firft Elements of Knowledge, and, as it were, the Letters of the Alphabet of which Words are compos'd, and of Words Sentences and Periods, and Difcourfe of Sentences: And thus the Scale of Thoughts anfwers, in fome Measure, to the feveral Parts of Speech,

We have faid enough concerning the Ideas. The Judgments and Ratiocinations follow, in which the Mind contemplates the Relations, Proportions, and mutual Regards of the Ideas, for we ought to take notice of this, that the Ideas, confider'd feparately, are incapable of offering any Truth to us, and that they neither conclude, nor affirm, or deny any Thing. This is another Action, another Faculty of the Soul, which by contemplating the Proportions, Regards, and Refpects, that there is between these Ideas, (I here take Ideas in the largest Senfe,) affirm or deny fomething concerning them, and confequently concerning the Things which they reprefent, as they accord or differ, imply or exclude, agree or are oppos'd to each other, and this according to their different Measure and Degrees. Now fancy, if you please, that the Ideas themfelves are corporeal Motions; what are these Relations between the Ideas, thefe Concatenations and Dependencies? But, laftly, what is this Judge, this Ruler of the Ideas, that examines as well the Ideas themselves, as the Relations they have to each other? compares them, weighs them, determines and reconciles them? and by comparing them, forms various Propofitions, and Concatenations of Propofitions?

LASTLY, do you believe that this Progrefs that you make in thinking, from fimple Perception to Judgment, from Judgment to

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Ratiocination, and from thence to a well-order'd Series and Context of Arguments? do you believe, I fay, that this Progress is made by the Impulse of one Part of the Soul on another, or by any Succeffion of Motions, according to the Laws of Matter and Local Motion? Most certainly you do not believe it: Turn your Eyes inward, confult yourself, interrogate your Soul, that is Mafter and confcious of itself; ask it, if thefe Operations are nothing but corporeal Mutations, but Touches, Impulfes, or Dashings against other of corpufcularian Particles, and that they are produc'd one from the other, according to the Laws of Local Motion. Your Soul, unless it lies against the Truth and itself, and is industrious to deprefs itself into an inferior Order of Things, which God did not ordain for it, but which yet it deferves, by reason of the Wrong and Injustice which it does to itself; I fay, unless it does that, it will ingenuously confefs, that it finds nothing at all of that in itself, nor is able to gather from any Indication, that thefe Operations are perform'd in it after a corporeal Manner, by virtue of its own or of any other Body; but that by a Power peculiar to itself, and according to the Laws of a thinking Nature, from the Contemplation of its Ideas, and the Relation between those Ideas, new Contemplations more compounded arife, as it were, fo many new Births, or new Conceptions, after them.

To confirm this Teftimony which the Soul gives concerning itself, provided it be frank and ingenuous, let us recollect a little what has been faid above: That Truth or Falfhood, properly call'd fo, does not confift in the bare Ideas taken feparately from each other, but in the right Difpofition of feveral Ideas among one another to their different Kinds, and their feveral Relations; for fo Propofitions and Judgments are form'd in the Mind, from which Ratiocination is afterwards wrought; and from them both, Difcourfe of whatever Nature, Oration, or Differtation. From what has been faid, we form two Obfervations: The first is, that the greatest Force of Mind that can poffibly be conceiv'd, is feen in its contemplating, diftinguishing, determining the Relations that Things have to one another, or the Ideas of Things. As Argumentation turns upon thefe, or makes its Progrefs from one to another, according to their mutual Connexions or Relations, the whole Series, and Progrefs, and Concatenation of Thoughts depends entirely upon these. The Ideas of Things that fall under the Imagination, being separately taken from thefe, are like fo much Sand without Lime: The Things which cement them, are the forefaid Relations perceiv'd by the Understanding only. I fay, perceiv'd by the Understanding only; for the fecond Obfervation that we make is this, that the Relations of Things of this Nature