Devotion does not consist in, and is not constituted by any acts or series of acts of adoration and prayer. It is a habit of the mind, an affection of the soul, which should be just as much a constant and unintermitting element in its existence, as any of the affections or emotions of an inferior nature, which refer themselves to any of the relations of life. A man loves his father or his children when absent, as much as when present-when thinking of something else, as much as when thinking of them. And so is it with devotion to God. It is wrought into the whole constitution, it becomes an integral part of the character. It is the attraction of the spiritual world. It is a sentiment felt by the mind towards the Great Centre of the universe, just as the power of attraction is felt by the bodies of the physical world. It exists when no external act of adoration or worship is engaged in, just as gravity would continue equally strong though bodies never moved. Prayer is only the occasional exhibition or indulgence of that which is the prevailing emotion of the mind. And the philosopher, to whose mind every exhibition of the mysterious powers of nature suggests ideas of the existence and attributes and providence of his Creator, renders thus an ascription of praise, as acceptable to God and as improving to his own heart, as if it had been formed into words, and uttered in the house of worship.

Not that we are to undervalue the importance, we may say the imperative necessity to the human mind, in its present state of existence, of actual prayer. Though devotion does not consist merely or principally in this act, it does not exist without it. No truly devout man can refrain from it. Devotion excites to prayer, and prayer nourishes and keeps alive devotion. Yet, as on the one hand there may be devotion without prayer, so on the other there is prayer without devotion. The most devout men are not perhaps always those who pray the most, or at least who are known to pray the most. Now even the mere physical beauties of the external world, operate strongly upon religious minds to excite feelings of devotion; how much more then must the knowledge of those hidden, but sublime truths, which give to nature a spiritual essence, of those beauties which pass the sense and are perceived only by the soul, excite in a properly educated mind a kindred sentiment!

We have endeavoured, feebly, we fear, to express a few of our sentiments upon what we esteem a most important subject. We have endeavoured to excite some interest, in religious minds, in that which is now attracting, and is destined still more to attract a large proportion of the attention of the world. The study of

the physical sciences is fast becoming one of the occupations or the amusements of an important portion of mankind, and in their application to the arts they are adapted to produce as great an influence upon the aspect of human affairs, upon the relative greatness and intelligence of nations, as any other cause. We know, for we have seen, what effects they will bring about in the increase of wealth and power and means of enjoyment; but it remains yet to be seen what they are to do for man as a moral and religious being;-whether their influence is to be nothing or worse than nothing, or whether it is to be made, as it may be made, of positive advantage. They will, we think, inevitably become an instrument of great power. It remains to be seen whether it shall be wielded by the foes or the friends of revealed truth;—whether it shall be permitted, in the hands of its foes, to strike a deadly blow at its vital interests, or, in those of its friends, to become at once the shield and the sword by which its adversaries are to be foiled and its triumphs secured.

ART. II.—A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. In two Volumes. By MOSES STUART, Associate Professor of Sacred Literature, in the Theological Seminary at Andover. Vol. I. Andover, 1827. 8vo.

[Continued from vol. iv. p. 519.]

WE resume the subject which we left unfinished in our last number; namely, THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE EPIstle to the HEBREWS. The argument which we shall now bring forward to show that its author was not St Paul, involves a topic of great moment; the question, upon what principles, and for what purposes, quotations from the Jewish scriptures were adduced by the different writers of the New Testament. The importance of this topic must have been perceived by every one who has undertaken to examine it, and has reflected upon its various bearings. Obstacles, almost insuperable, have for fourteen centuries been opposed to all free and rational investigation of every subject illustrating the history and character of Christianity. Worthless, therefore, as are most of the discussions of those subjects, yet we know of no branch of inquiry, which has been treated in a manner more confused, superficial, and unsatisfactory, than the question respecting the quotations from the Old Testament found in the New. The attentive reader of the scriptures can have proceeded but a little way

in the Gospel of Matthew, without being greatly perplexed by the manner in which he finds the words of the Old Testament alleged. But there is no book to be pointed out to him, affording a satisfactory solution of his difficulties. In illustrating the argument respecting the authorship of the Epistle, now to be stated, it will be necessary to consider at some length the subject just adverted to.

This argument is, that St Paul and the writer to the Hebrews differ widely from each other in their prevailing mode of interpreting the Jewish scriptures, in the use which they make, in reasoning, of passages from those scriptures, and in their style of reasoning generally.

This is a subject which cannot be fully understood without attending to some preliminary considerations.

Strict philosophical reasoning is one of the last products of a highly disciplined intellect in a very improved state of society; the final attainment of long continued effort. To be generally determined in our opinions by reason alone, or in other words, by considerations presented to the understanding only, is to have arrived at a very high degree of intellectual superiority. Opinion, or belief, for the most part, is the result of impressions made on the imagination, the feelings, or the passions. Much which has the appearance of reasoning, is only a mode of presenting a topic in such a manner, as that, through some principle or other of our nature, the desired effect may be produced. It is verbal, depending upon the ambiguous sense of words, which a writer may arrange ingeniously into propositions that look like arguments, and thus deceive his readers and himself.-It is drawn from striking, loose, insufficient analogies, with which the imagination is amused and occupied, while the understanding sleeps.It is baseless; there are no principles on which it rests; yet there is an array and connexion of thoughts, which may occupy the mind, so as to exclude the perception that they depend not upon acknowledged truths, but upon mere assumptions.-It produces a series of vivid conceptions; and though vivid conception is not, as it has been said to be, belief, yet we readily pass from it to the opinion, that what presents itself to our apprehension in such well defined lineaments and permanent colors, must have a real existence. It addresses the passions and prejudices; it flatters and excites them; and the judgment is not permitted to examine the pretences which they sieze upon.-That it is the business of the reasoner to address the understanding only, and to consider only what will bear the eye of pure intellect, and that by such reasoning alone our belief ought to be determined, are

principles, which never have been practically recognized to any considerable extent. To repeat what has in effect been said before, if we were to judge of reasoning from very much which has borne that name in ancient times, and in our own also, it might be defined the art of possessing the mind, through the medium of any of its faculties, with a particular conception, which may affect the feelings and character as if it were conformed to truth. The person who admits it, feels and acts as if it were so. It becomes his way of thinking. He feels and acts as a wise man ought to do, who had perceived it to be true through an exercise of intellect.

Hence, it may be remarked, follows much uncertainty in the history of philosophy and of the progress of the human mind. Opinions produced in the manner described, now assume a substantial form as matters of proper faith, and now fade away till they become, or seem to become, shadowy and unreal conceptions. The provinces of the imagination and the intellect are confounded; they exercise a joint reign; and it is often difficult or impossible to say what should be regarded as a proposition actually believed, and what, as a mere fanciful conception, in which the mind indulges, as having probably some general correspondence to the truth.

Reasoning of the kind which has been described, appears under a wholly different aspect, as viewed by him to whose mind it is adapted, and by another at the distance of two thousand years, whose habits of thinking have been formed under very different influences. It is, as if, in the common experiment in optics with a cylindrical mirror, one were looking at the regular, and perhaps beautiful image reflected by the glass, and another at the confused mass of colors and deformed shape of the picture before it. In order to form a just estimate of ancient writings, we must go back to the time when they were produced, and place ourselves in the situation of those by whom and for whom they were written. As regards the reasoning of the ancients, we must make a due allowance for all the improvement which has been attained in that difficult art during the last two or three centuries; and likewise for all the knowledge which has been acquired, for all the truths which have been ascertained, all the errors which have been exploded, and all the principles which have been settled, during the same period. These considerations apply to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Among his contemporaries, he was probably distinguished for his intellectual powers. But his reasoning cannot be regarded as of any force by an intelligent reader of the pres

ent day. It is difficult so far to accommodate our minds to the conceptions and principles of the author and his cotemporaries, as to perceive how it was adapted to produce any effect at the time when it was written. It belongs to the Alexandrine and Rabbinical schools. It is founded, for the most part, upon the Old Testament; but not upon the language of the Old Testament taken in its obvious sense, and interpreted upon common principles. On the contrary, after the fashion of the Jews of his time, the writer deduces from its words hidden and mystical senses, and strange and unfounded inferences, which he adapts to his purpose. The Jews believed that the Old Testament, beside the meaning which it presented when understood according to the common use of language, was full of other thoughts, lying deeper and more precious. They regarded its words as containing different meanings, one within another, of which the most obvious, that expressed by the words taken according to their common acceptation, was often comparatively worthless. To those imaginary senses, and to the style of interpretation by which they are educed, the epithet allegorical has been technically applied.* The allegorical mode of interpretation was familiar to the Jews before the introduction of Christianity. From the first it prevailed among Christians; and though condemned by Luther, continued to be practised till long after the Reformation. We find, indeed, considerable remains of it at the present day, in notions respecting types, prefigurations, and a double sense of prophecy, and in the opinion that the Song of Solomon is a sacred allegory. The mystical, secondary senses ascribed to the words of scripture by this mode of interpretation, were in their nature arbitrary and fanciful. Of those employed by the writer to the Hebrews, many appear to have rested on traditional authority in the Rabbinical schools, and so far to have afforded support for a show of reasoning. Others he seems to have thought were sufficiently recommended by their intrinsic probability, and apparent coincidence with the truth.

The remote occasion of the allegorical style of interpretation is to be found, perhaps, in the custom, which, in early times, prevailed throughout the East and Egypt, of expressing abstract truths and historical facts in allegories, parables, dark sayings, symbols, and such figures as could not be understood by one

* In this use of the word, conformably to its etymology in Greek, it is taken in a more extensive sense than usual. An allegorical meaning is any supposed mystical meaning, answering in some sort to the true meaning of a passage, whether that passage be literal or figurative; whether it be regarded as a proper allegory, in the common English sense of the term, or not. Allegorical interpretation is the process by which such supposed meanings are educed.