its members make themselves the sole judge of what constitu superiority; and whilst other "superior races" would concede t all stand upon a higher plane than that occupied by the colou races, each regards itself as facile princeps. And since, if subju tion is to be undertaken on the mere ground of superiority, it eminently desirable that it should be undertaken by the m superior, or at any rate in accordance with some consensus as to ness, there seems to be a preliminary question to be fought amongst the competing claimants for the honour. Mere superiori however, affords no moral basis for subjugation; assuming for t moment that the conquerors do stand upon a higher plane, it d not follow that their aggressive actions contribute to the progress the world. Such a contention ignores the evils attending up conquest, and in particular the grave evil of the withdrawal of liber It is in reality the growth of collective freedom that constitutes o of the main indices of a progressive civilisation; and to assert th civilisation is advanced by the destruction of freedom comes perilous near to a contradiction in terms. Pushed to its logical conclusio the contention means that, having first settled the knotty point as which is the most superior race, that race should be absolute supreme, and hold the liberties and destinies of the world in i hands.

But is the claim to superiority which is so complacently post lated one that can be established by any of the numerous claimants That the white races have a greater brain capacity and have attain a higher degree of intellectual development is not to be denie although the statement would probably be challenged by represent tives of coloured races, some of whom certainly exhibit the ver highest mental qualities. Superiority, however, is not to be dete mined simply by facial angles or philosophical achievements: the mor factor is all important, and the ethical standard to which a race ha attained is very largely indicated by the extent to which it is imbue with the principle of humanitarianism. And here we come back the fact that subjugation never is undertaken in pursuance of the principle, that the motives are almost invariably selfish; whil the national morality of the conqueror is often inferior and seldo superior to that of the conquered. At the heart of the campaig against what we term "backward races" is the principle of nationa aggrandisement; and the cruelty which is exhibited towards then if different in kind, is not less defensible than that which the exhibit. Says Mr. Herbert Spencer: "The inhumanity practise by the races classed as civilised has certainly not been less, and ha often been greater, than that practised by the races classed as un civilised." And we have only to read the details attending th process of subjugation, by whatsoever people and in whatsoeve period, to realise that this statement is absolutely accurate. Th

acquisition, extension, and maintenance of our Indian Empire have been characterised by atrocities which seem to indicate that the lust of conquest converts men into fiends. The treachery and brutality displayed towards the aborigines of South Africa are calculated to imbue them with the idea that Christianity is a religion, not of love, but of hate. Amidst the revolting butchery of the Soudan, the heroic characters which are seen in lurid relief are not the victors' but their Dervish victims. And if we look to other victorious nations, we find they point the same moral. Whether it is the Belgian in the Congo, the Spaniard in Cuba, the American in the Philippines, or the German in China, there stands revealed a like condition of things. Nowhere can we discover that the process of subjugation gives signs of the higher civilisation or indicates that it is inspired by altruistic motives. Nay, if we take the most recent instance pertinent to ourselves, where in the whole history of savage" warfare shall we find a parallel to the ghastly characteristic of our South African campaign—a characteristic which shall surely render it infamous for all time-of five women and children being doomed to die of pestilence and hunger for every man slain in the ranks of the enemy?

We reach therefore this general conclusion that, whilst theoretically it is possible to make out a case for the subjugation of one race by another, in practice the essential condition, namely, humanitarianism as the dominating factor, is invariably wanting, and conquest never has possessed, and probably never will possess, complete ethical justification. And if it is conceded that there must nevertheless be a balancing of good and evil, and that a partial justification may exist, determined by the approximation which is made to the principle of humanitarianism, we unhappily find that, whilst subjugating races inferentially recognise the validity of the principle and always pose as benefactors, they not infrequently by their conduct absolutely ignore such principle, and in any case it occupies quite a subsidiary position. That not a tittle of good has ever resulted from conquest, or that it always partakes of unmitigated vice, would of course be an extravagant and wholly indefensible contention; and if it were necessary to establish that, the case against alien coercion would break down. But that good to the extent to which conquering nations, in their pride or ignorance, so confidently consider to be attendant upon their actions; or that (whether in motive, aim, or result) beneficence largely figures, is a pernicious delusion. The pursuit of self-interests as the conscious or unconscious spring of action, the failure to recognise the solidarity of the race, or to promote the welfare of mankind in general, the absence of any marked superiority of a moral character, are all condemnatory of the destruction of liberty involved in subjugation, as stultifying the only valid plea for that destruction. Hence, the

growth of the modern Imperialist spirit, so far from being pr nounced a boon, must be regarded as a bane. Whatever conclusi may be arrived at with regard to the theory of "benevole despotism" as applied to our actual rule of subject peoples, benev lence is assuredly not characteristic of the preliminary process; a our responsibility towards those peoples is considerably enhance by the circumstance that their conquest has invariably lack adequate moral defence.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SUBJUGATED RACES.

The existence of the British Empire, however, remains stupendous fact. Whether we ought or ought not to hav acquired dominion over a quarter of the globe, we have acquire it; and the problem, therefore, of how it is to be governed is mos momentous, and is not to be summarily disposed of by demonstrat ing that the problem is one which, to a great extent, should neve have arisen, and that alien rule has been unjustifiable ab initio. O course, it is easy to say that if wrong has been done our duty con sists in remedying it without delay, and that if liberty has bee unwarrantably taken away it should be restored. But breaches o the moral law are not to be repaired by a stroke of the pen; and i a governing race, exercising sway over millions of people, could b induced to believe that it ought to cease to govern, it would onl give rise to chaos by abruptly acting upon that belief, and would thus be perpetrating another grave injury. The status quo ante car never be re-established, nor can habits of self-reliance, if onc weakened or destroyed, be restored otherwise than gradually When a race has been robbed of its freedom; when it has been rendered more or less dependent upon another; when its own form of government, however crude, has been replaced by alien govern ment; when it has been deprived of the means of self-defence, an when opportunity for natural development has been denied itwhen, in short, it has been reduced to the position of helples children—for it to be suddenly abandoned and left to its own feebl and unorganised resources would merely mean that it would becom a speedy prey either to other aggressive nations or to roving piratica adventurers, or, at the best, would succumb to internal feuds of tyranny. This, then, is a course which would be absolutel forbidden us, though the nation should be miraculously converted t a policy of unselfishness.

But it does not follow that our present rule is satisfactory, or the a solution of this momentous problem of government is foun in the theory of benevolent despotism. The popular deferce arbitrary rule rests, as was intimated at the outset, upon tw hypotheses, namely, that benevolence justifes despotism, and the

benevolence characterises despotism; and we have yet to undertake the main inquiry of whether these hypotheses are valid.

Does, then, benevolence justify despotism? No one will deny that, if we are to have arbitrary rule, it is better it should be benevolent than otherwise. But, assuming for the moment it to be benevolent, is it vindicated? With regard to the preliminary process of subjugation, it has been sought to establish that this is only defensible when it proceeds upon the principle of humanitarianism, and if that is so, then the continuing process of government is only defensible upon the same principle. The one prominent feature of conquest is the denial of liberty; the one prominent feature of arbitrary rule is the persistence in that denial; it is a repetition of the original act. Whatever justification, therefore, the preliminary procedure requires is à fortiori required by the continued procedure. There must be the same recognition of the solidarity of the race, the same donation to the common good, the same promotion of the progress of the world. There must be the same disregard to purely national interests, the same benefit conferred upon those who have been subjugated, the same contribution towards the advancement of civilisation. In short, there is only one moral basis for coercion, whether definite or indefinite in point of time, and whatever the nature of the coercion may be.

Now, although benevolence is an admirable and, to some extent, a redeeming quality, it is not (even when regarded as comprising beneficence) synonymous or co-extensive with humanitarianism, for it lacks many of the attributes intended to be connoted by the latter term. Well-wishing or well-doing is involved in that term; but, as we have seen, much more is also involved. If humanitarianism includes benevolence, it goes far beyond it; its vista embraces the whole race, and not simply a particular section, and it is more penetrating. This is no verbal quibble; the justification which the defenders of despotism postulate is a mere kindly regard for the welfare of the governed; and even as to this there is no quantitative measure, and a very little is made to go a long way. It is quite sufficient that some benefit should be conferred, or should be intended or supposed to be conferred; and the extent of the positive benefit may be very small, whilst its relative bearing on humanity as a whole is not necessarily taken into account. The conception is generally limited to the subject race, the assumption being that particular good contributes to universal good. That this is so in some cases is, of course, perfectly true; but it is a very dangerous generalisation to make. For not only may particular good be done to some to the injury of others, but even as regards those upon whom particular good is conferred it may be far outweighed by the particular evil involved in the process. To seek to promote benevolence through

VOL. 160.-No. 1.

B

the medium of despotism is at the best a very delicate undertaking; to point to some benefit conferred, whilst ignoring the mischief inherent in the despotism is a mere evasion; and, even to establish that in the special instance the benefit is greater than the mischief, is very far from conclusive. Our survey must take a wider range: despotic government is prima facie antagonistic to progress; it is at the best a choice of evils; and, in seeking to justify it in special cases, we must regard its influence and effect upon humanity as a whole and not simply upon one section. And here we are met with the fact that the pursuit of self-interests is invariably largely characteristic of despotism, and that the mere tempering of despotism with benevolence does not eliminate the selfish factor. Moreover, the theory involves the idea of continued, if not permanent, arbitrary government; for to assert that such government is beneficial to the governed is inferentially to assert that it should be indefinitely prolonged; and, indeed, this is the conclusion which is consciously or unconsciously deduced. But if despotism is a bad thing in itself and only defensible as an alternative to something worse, then, assuming this justification can be established at a particular time and in particular circumstances, that justification cannot be permanent, but demands periodical renewal. The principle of humanitarianism enforces this demand, it will be satisfied with nothing less, it must be progressive; whereas the principle of benevolence does not enforce the demand, it is less exacting, and is content to be stationary. Briefly, beneficence at the best can only be a mitigating feature of arbitrary rule; it can never amount to a complete vindication,

It is very common to compare the control of a "lower" race by a "superior" race to the control of children by parents, and this analogy is confidently regarded as an effective answer to the critic. Just as children on account of their immaturity stand in need of discipline and guidance, and cannot, without courting disaster, be left to their own feeble resources, so (it is urged) the undeveloped man is incapable of self-government and cannot be safely left in the enjoyment of freedom. The analogy sounds plausible, but if examined it will be found to fail in several important respects, as is generally the case when an analogy is employed to establish a proposition. In the first place, without denying that marked differences may exist between two races, it is an unprovable assumption that the one exhibits the characteristics of children and the other the qualifi cations of parents. The "inferior" race may be far removed from the incapacity of infancy, and the "superior" race may often show unequivocal signs of puerility; indeed, if the right to freedom is to depend upon its being invariably used without injury to oneself or to others, where is the nation to be found that could establish such a right or is entitled to occupy the judgment-seat? In the next place