CHAP. - To this event, so unexpected by the other powers A.D. 1678. of Europe, succeeded another which excited equal surprise. On the fourth day after the conclusion of peace, the prince of Orange fought the fierce and sanguinary battle of St. Denis. Of the few fortresses which still remained in the possession of the Spaniards, Mons was the first in strength and importance; but on the east of Mons lay the hostile garrison of Binche, on the west that of St. Guislain; the country to the south was in the hands of the enemy; and early in the spring a strong corps, passing the river Haine, had formed an intrenched camp to the north, and intercepted the communication with Brussels. The blockade had already produced a scarcity within the walls; and in the councils of the confederates it was resolved to make the relief of Mons their first object after the termination of the armistice. With this view the prince, anticipating nothing less than the signature of the treaty, ordered his forces to assemble on the 30th of August 4. July, and on the 4th of August led them against the enemy, who were commanded by the duke of Luxembourg. In the valley in front of their camp the French held two fortified positions, the abbey of St. Denis, and the ruins of a fortress called Casteau: the first after an obstinate struggle was carried by the prince of Orange, the second by the duke of Villa Hermosa; but the enemy recovered the latter towards the evening, pursued the Spaniards into the plain, and would have cut off the retreat of the Dutch from St. influence they feared, and with the aid of De Crosse, the Swedish agent, who brought the order, circulated a report that a secret understanding still existed between Charles and Louis. This, it was believed, led to the clandestine mission of Boreel from the city of Amsterdam to Van Beverning.-Temple, ii. 445-449Dalrymple, ii. 178. Danby, 256, 289. V. Denis, had they not been kept at bay by the desperate CHAP. resistance of the English auxiliaries under the earl of A.D. 1678. Ossory. During the night the two armies resumed their former positions.1 By many this action, in which the lives of five thousand men were sacrificed, has been deemed a foul blot on the character of William. That he was ignorant of the conclusion of peace no man could believe. The proceedings of Nimeguen, which were already known in London, could not be unknown in the neighbourhood of Brussels; and his haste to commence the battle, though a British force of eight thousand men was on its march to his assistance, proved his anxiety to anticipate the arrival, if it had not already taken place, of contrary orders from the States. But even ignorance in his circumstances could not form a valid excuse; to justify the renewal of hostilities, he ought to have known that the French had suffered the term of fourteen days to elapse without accepting the conditions of peace. It is not, however, difficult to discover the motives by which he was actuated. On the one hand, it was of the first importance to Holland that Mons should not fall into the possession of the French, and yet, though the garrison was reduced to extremity by famine, no provision had been made for its relief in the treaty; on the other, a victory obtained over the blockading army would probably prevent the ratification of the peace, and give to William himself the undisputed ascendancy over his political opponents. The attempt was 1 For this battle see the memoirs of Lord Castlehaven, who held a command in the Spanish army, App. 52-56. 2 See Louis, iv. 171, 172; James, i. 511. See the duke of York's letter of Aug. 4, in Dalrymple, ii. 189, and Danby's of Aug. 5, Letters, 293. 4 Louis, iv. 167. Dalrymple, ii. 189, 190. Danby's Letters, 232. V. August 5. CHAP. therefore made; and, though he gained no victory, A.D. 1678. the fortress at least was saved. The next morning the duke of Luxembourg announced to him the conAugust 9. clusion of peace; the armies, after several conferences, separated, that of the allies retiring towards Nivelles, that of France towards Ath, and the communication between Mons and the capital was once more restored.1 In England the duration of the session and the expectation of peace had drawn from parliament several grants of money for the purpose of discharging the extraordinary expenses incurred by the July 15. preparations for war. A prorogation followed: Charles found himself at the head of a numerous army, with eight hundred thousand pounds at his command; and he resolved to keep his word to the prince of Orange, and to teach his brother of France the value of his friendship. Fresh bodies of troops were successively sent to Flanders; the Spaniards received assurances of the king's readiness to procure for them the conditions formerly offered at Nimeguen; and the States were summoned, in pursuance of their late treaty, to unite with England for the purpose of compelling the French king to stand to his promise. But it was 2 "If God bless the prince in this one enterprise of Mons, he will be "greater here than ever his ancestors were."-Temple, in Danby's Letters, 254. 1 Dumont, vii. 364. 2 Temple professes himself ignorant why Charles acted with so much vigour on this occasion; but says that he was advised afterwards that the king's object was to please the parliament on account of the discovery which was then made of the "plot." That, however, is impossible. For Hyde was despatched to Holland on the 12th of August (Danby, 232. Dalrymple, ii. 190), and it is certain that the first intimation of the plot was given to the king on the following day. From the letters of Danby and the duke of York, it appears that the king could not learn the articles of the treaty signed by the Dutch, but knew that worse terms had been offered to the V. Before the expira- Sept. 7. too late to kindle again the dying embers of war. CHAP. His interference, indeed, encouraged the Spaniards to A.D. 1678. demand more favourable conditions; and it gave so much confidence to the anti-Gallican party in the States, that the prince still cherished a hope of recovering the ascendancy; but Louis knew how to yield when it was for his interest. He had already ratified August 5. the peace on his part; his ambassadors were instructed to assume a tone of unusual moderation; they receded Sept. 1. from several of their demands; and every subject of dispute with the Spanish ambassadors was referred to the decision of the Dutch. This policy succeeded, and the confederacy was broken. tion of the six weeks, the Spanish ambassadors reluctantly submitted to the terms dictated by their powerful enemy; in a few months the and the empire followed their example; and an end was put to the war, which had raged for six years from the shores of the Baltic to those of the Mediterranean.1 That the result, so glorious to Louis, so alarming to the other princes of Europe, was in a great measure owing to the indecisive, vacillating, and contradictory conduct of the English cabinet, cannot be denied. But the blame must not be laid exclusively on the king; it ought to be shared with him by the leaders of the country party. If his poverty, his love of ease, his fear of the opposition in parliament, taught him to shrink from the cares and embarrassments consequent on a declaration of war, their desire of popularity, combined with party spirit, perhaps with more mercenary emperor Spaniards than before; that he believed Louis did not intend to make a general peace; and that the account of the battle of St. Denis, sent by the prince, taught him to expect a second battle, and a continuation of the war.-Danby's Letters, 232, 233, 256, 296. 1 Dumont, vii. 352, 363, 376. 1679. Jan. 26. V. CHAP. motives, led them to act in opposition to their profesA.D. 1679. sions, to urge the king to take part in the quarrel, and at the same time to prevent him from following their advice by refusing the necessary supplies. In truth the jealousy of the two parties was so deeply rooted, their strength in the House of Commons so nearly balanced, that the powers of government became paralyzed, and the crown of England lost its legitimate influence in the councils of Europe. From continental politics the reader must now divert his attention to one of the most extraordinary occurrences in our domestic history, the imposture generally known by the appellation of Oates's plot; an imposture which, brought forward in a time of popular discontent, and supported by the arts and declamations of a numerous party, goaded the passions of men to a state of madness, and seemed for a while to extinguish the native good sense and humanity of the English character. Its author and hero was Titus Oates, alias Ambrose, the son of a ribbon-weaver, who, exchanging the loom for the bible, distinguished himself as an Anabaptist minister during the government of Cromwell, and became an orthodox clergyman on the restoration of the ancient dynasty. Titus was sent to Cambridge, took orders, and officiated as curate in several parishes, and as chaplain on board a man-of-war; but all these situations he successively forfeited in consequence of his misconduct, of reports attributing to him unnatural propensities, and of the odium incurred by two malicious prosecutions, in each of which his testimony upon oath was disproved to the satisfaction of the jury. Houseless and penniless, Oates applied for relief to the compassion of Dr. Tonge, rector of St. Michael's |