from capture by those of his adopted country, but is under its protection. The privilege is supposed to be equal to the disadvantage, and is therefore just. The double privilege claimed seems too unreasonable to be granted (d).

Merchants

residing in

The national character of merchants residing in Europe § 333. and America is derived from that of the country in which they reside. In the eastern parts of the world, European the east. persons, trading under the shelter and protection of the factories founded there, take their national character from that association under which they live and carry on their trade this distinction arises from the nature and habits of the countries. In the western part of the world, alien merchants mix in the society of the natives; access and intermixture are permitted, and they become incorporated to nearly the full extent. But in the east, from almost the oldest times, an immiscible character has been kept up; foreigners are not admitted into the general body and mass of the nation; they continue strangers and sojourners, as all their fathers were. Thus, with respect to establishments in Turkey, the British Courts of Prize, during war with Holland, determined that a merchant, carrying on trade at Smyrna, under the protection of the Dutch consul, was to be considered a Dutchman, and condemned his property as belonging to an enemy. And thus in China, and generally throughout the east, persons admitted into a factory are not known in their own peculiar national character: and not being permitted to assume the character of the country, are considered only in the character of that association or factory.

But these principles are considered not to be applicable to the vast territories occupied by the British in Hindostan; because, as Sir W. Scott observes, "though the sovereignty of the Mogul is occasionally brought forward for the purposes of policy, it hardly exists otherwise than as a phantom: it is not applied in any way for the regulation of their establishments. Great Britain exercises the power of declaring war and peace, which is among the strongest marks of actual sovereignty; and if the high and empyrean sovereignty of the Mogul is sometimes brought down from the clouds, as it

(d) The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheaton, 54; U. S. v. Guillem, 9 Howard, 60.

§ 334. House of

enemy's country.

were, for the purposes of policy, it by no means interferes with the actual authority which that country, and the East India Company, a creature of that country, exercise there with full effect. Merchants residing there are hence considered as British subjects" (e).

In general, the national character of a person, as neutral or trade in the enemy, is determined by that of his domicile; but the property of a person may acquire a hostile character, independently of his national character, derived from personal residence. Thus the property of a house of trade established in the enemy's country is considered liable to capture and condemnation as prize. This rule does not apply to cases arising at the commencement of a war, in reference to persons who, during peace, had habitually carried on trade in the enemy's country, though not resident there, and are therefore entitled to time to withdraw from that commerce. But if a person

§ 335. Converse of the

rule.

§ 336. Produce

enters into a house of trade in the enemy's country, or continues that connection during the war, he cannot protect himself by mere residence in a neutral country (ƒ).

The converse of this rule of the British Prize Courts, which has also been adopted by those of America, is not extended to the case of a merchant residing in a hostile country, and having a share in a house of trade in a neutral country. Residence in a neutral country will not protect his share in a house established in the enemy's country, though residence in the enemy's country will condemn his share in a house established in a neutral country. It is impossible not to see, in this want of reciprocity, strong marks of the partiality towards the interests of captors, which is perhaps inseparable from a prize code framed by judicial legislation in a belligerent country, and adapted to encourage its naval exertions (g).

The produce of an enemy's colony, or other territory, is to be considered as hostile property so long as it belongs to the owner of the soil, whatever may be his national character in considered other respects, or wherever may be his place of residence.

of the enemy's territory

as hostile,

This rule of the British Prize Courts was adopted by the

(c) The Indian Chief, 3 C. Rob. 12.

(f) The Vigilantia, 1 C. Rob. 1; The Susa, 2 C. Rob. 255; The Portland, 3 C. Rob. 41; The Jonge Klassina, 5 C. Rob. 297; The Antonia Johanna, 1 Wheaton, 159; The Freundschaft, 4 Wheaton, 105.

(g) Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253.

the soil,

national

domicile.

Supreme Court of the United States during the late war with so long as Great Britain, in the following case. The island of Santa it belongs to the Cruz, belonging to the King of Denmark, was subdued during owner of the late European war by the arms of his Britannic Majesty. whatever Adrian Benjamin Bentzon, an officer of the Danish govern- may be his ment, and a proprietor of land in the island, withdrew from character the island on its surrender, and had since resided in Denmark. or personal The property of the inhabitants being secured to them by the capitulation, he still retained his estate in the island under the management of an agent, who shipped thirty hogsheads of sugar, the produce of that estate, on board a British ship, and consigned to a commercial house in London, on account and risk of the owner. On her passage the vessel was captured by an American privateer, and brought in for adjudication. The sugars were condemned in the Court below as prize of war, and the sentence of condemnation was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court.

In pronouncing its judgment, it was stated by the Court, § 337. The Thirty that some doubt had been suggested whether Santa Cruz, Hogsheads while in the possession of Great Britain, could properly be of sugar. considered as a British island. But for this doubt there could be no foundation. Although acquisitions, made during war, are not considered as permanent, until confirmed by treaty, yet to every commercial and belligerent purpose they are considered as a part of the domain of the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and government of them. The island of Santa Cruz, after its capitulation, remained a British island until it was restored to Denmark.

The question was, whether the produce of a plantation in that island, shipped by the proprietor himself, who was a Dane residing in Denmark, must be considered as British, and therefore enemy's property.

In arguing this question the counsel for the claimants had made two points. 1. That the case did not come within the rule applicable to shipments from an enemy's country, even as laid down in the British Courts of Admiralty. 2. That the rule had not been rightly laid down in those Courts, and consequently would not be adopted in those of the United States.

1. Did the rule laid down in the British Courts of

§ 338. Examina

tion of British

cases by the Supremie Court.

Admiralty embrace this case? It appeared to the Court that the case of The Phoenix was precisely in point. In that case a vessel was captured in a voyage from Surinam to Holland, and a part of the cargo was claimed by persons residing in Germany, then a neutral country, as the produce of their estates in Surinam. The counsel for the captors considered the law of the case as entirely settled. The counsel for the claimants did not controvert this position. They admitted it, but endeavoured to extricate their case from the general principle by giving it the protection of the treaty of Amiens. In pronouncing his judgment, Sir William Scott laid down the general rule thus: "Certainly nothing can be more decided and fixed, as the principle of this Court, and of the Supreme Court, upon very solemn argument there, than that the possession of the soil does impress upon the owner the character of the country, so far as the produce of that plantation is concerned, in its transportation to any other country whatever the local residence of the owner may be. This has been so repeatedly decided, both in this and the Superior Court, that it is no longer open to discussion. No question can be made upon the point of law at this day" (h).

Afterwards, in the case of The Vrow Anna Catharina, Sir William Scott laid down the rule, and stated its reason. It cannot be doubted," said he, "that there are transactions so radically and fundamentally national as to impress the national character, independent of peace or war, and the local residence of the parties. The produce of a person's own plantation in the colony of the enemy, though shipped in time of peace, is liable to be considered as the property of the enemy, by reason that the proprietor has incorporated himself with the permanent interests of the nation as a holder of the soil, and is to be taken as a part of that country in that particular transaction, independent of his own personal residence and occupation" (i).

It was contended that this rule, laid down with so much precision, did not embrace Mr. Bentzon's claim, because he had "not incorporated himself with the permanent interests of the nation." He acquired the property while Santa Cruz

(h) The Phonix, 5 C. Rob. 21.

(i) The Vrow Anna Catharina, 5 C. Rob. 167.

was a Danish colony, and he withdrew from the island when it became British.

This distinction did not appear to the Court to be a sound one. The identification of the national character of the owner with that of the soil, in the particular transaction, is not placed on the dispositions with which he acquires the soil, or on his general national character. The acquisition of land in Santa Cruz bound the claimant, so far as respects that land, to the fate of Santa Cruz, whatever its destiny might be. While that island belonged to Denmark, the produce of the soil, while unsold, was, according to this rule, Danish property, whatever might be the general national character of the particular proprietor. When the island became British, the soil and its produce, while that produce remained unsold, were British. The general, commercial, or political character of Mr. Bentzon could not, according to this rule, affect that particular transaction. Although incorporated, so far as respects his general national character, with the permanent interests of Denmark, he was incorporated, so far as respected his plantation in Santa Cruz, with the permanent interests of Santa Cruz, which was at that time British; and though, as a Dane, he was at war with Great Britain, and an enemy, yet as a proprietor of land in Santa Cruz, he was no enemy: he could ship his produce to Great Britain in perfect safety.

2. The case was therefore certainly within the rule as laid down by the British Prize Courts. The next inquiry was, how far that rule will be adopted in this country?

rule in

The law of nations is the great source from which we derive § 339 Adoption those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which of the are recognized by all civilized and commercial States through- English out Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten, and America. in part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of reason and justice: but, as these principles will be differently understood by different nations under different circumstances, we consider them as being, in some degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The decisions of the courts of every

country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect. The decisions of the courts of every country show