other hand, a more labored proof was attempted, that any want of conformity to the law of God, must be sinful, in creatures of our capacities, and under our obligations. That if we neglect, or imperfectly perform, any duty; if we have not the love of God in us, or are wanting in good will to our fellow-men; if we do not repent, or do not believe in Christ; or if we be destitute of, or deficient in, a right temper of mind in a word, unless we do perfectly well, and are perfectly good, so far sin lieth at our door.

I now proceed, and shall endeavor to show,

H. That if any of us say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. That is, if we think thus for so the apostle is certainly to be understood. We may deceive others, by saying what we know is false; but to believe a lie, being imposed upon by our own hearts, is self-deception.

Perhaps it may be thought, that no one will imagine concerning himself, what is here supposed; and therefore that the point now before us needs no proof, and will admit of little profitable enlargement. But it is really one of the most difficult points to establish, to the sensible conviction of every man's conscience. Not that there would be any difficulty in it, were it not a truth which is against every man, and which therefore every man will be against. Were it not that the hearts of men, which are full of pride and selfish partiality, will be ever ready to fill their heads with sophistical arguments in their own exculpation. Only exhibiting the general proofs that all men are sinners, which might soon be done, would consequentially prove, that any one must be self-deceived, who supposes he has no sin. But I shall be more particular : and attend to the several senses in which one may say this, and the several grounds on which it may be said. A man's meaning, when he says it, may be ; that he never has been guilty of any sin; or he may

mean only, that now he is free from all sin. And according to the different senses in which this is said, the grounds that men go upon in saying it will be different. We will go over the several grounds on which men may say this, in one or the other of these senses; and see if we cannot discover the fallacy of saying it in either sense, on any ground.

1. Some may say in their hearts that they have no sin, and never have had any, because they imagine that they have always meant well, and done the best they could. If they have not done so much as some others, it has been because of their want of talents, or of opportunities; and not because of any want of a willing mind. If they have sometimes dishonored God, or done hurt to their fellow-men, it was owing to ignorance, or to inadvertency, and not to any bad intention. They have always endeavored to do right, and can recollect few if any instances in which they have conducted much amiss. Thus it was with the young ruler who came running to Christ, and respectfully inquired of him what good thing he must. do, that he might have eternal life. When our Saviour directed him to keep the commandments, and mentioned several of them, he readily replied, "All these have I observed from my youth up; what lack I yet?"

But if on this ground any say they have no sin, certainly they deceive themselves. The commandment is exceeding broad." No man can think that he has never been guilty of any transgression of God's perfect law, nor of any want of conformity to it, when he rightly understands all that it forbids, and all that it requires. But unconvinced sinners have always some cloak for their sins. The present imperfect state of fallen man, is an excuse ever ready at hand. We know that we come short; and we know that we transgress: but who does not? or how is it possible that such poor frail creatures should be as

holy as angels? "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." We wish to be perfect; but it is not in our power. Thus men justify themselves. And they would indeed be altogether justifiable, were this truly the case. "If there be a willing mind, it is accepted," in all cases," according to that a man hath." But that any imagine their wills or wishes are so good, can be owing only to the deceitfulness of sin. The want of a disposition, is all the inability we labor under to do whatever God requires of us. Paul says, indeed, he found a law that when he would do good, evil was present with him. This, however, was the law of sin-the remainder of depraved nature. His desire to do the whole will of God was sincere ; but it was not perfect. He found much in himself that was contrary to it, whence he was often overcome by temptation. This he acknowledges to be sin that dwelt in him. He speaks of it as a crime, not

as an excuse.

But the heart which is desperately wicked, is deceitful above all things; who can know it? Those in whom its depravity is total, have often no real apprehension of its being depraved at all. Their impotency to that which is good, and to keep themselves from what is evil, they conceive to be in their heads, or hands, or feet; and know not that it is in their hearts. Hence they complain of it as a weakness, and do not condemn it as any wickedness.

Some, however, insist that their inability renders them excusable, let it be where it will, and what it will. If the seat of it be in their heart, they cannot help it. They were born with such depraved dispositions, and they are unable to alter them: how then is having them, or acting according to them, their fault? Just as if a bad heart were not at all blameable in itself. Just as if it were not our duty to do good, or to abstain from doing evil, any further than we have an inclination. Do we ever reason thus, except in our own case? Do we not always think others faulty

when they do ill, though we charitably believe their hearts are no better than our own? What father is there that doth not condemn an undutiful son? what master is there that doth not blame a disobedient servant? what man is there that doth not cry out against a neighbor who hath slandered him, or defrauded him, or robbed and wounded him? And yet the undutiful son, the disobedient servant, the slanderer, the defrauder, the robber, or murderer, may all plead not guilty on this ground, as well as any sinner against God. They have all wicked hearts: they were born with them; and cannot alter them, nor try to alter them. Men will for ever condemn others, when injured or abused, notwithstanding such an excuse as this: if therefore we justify ourselves on this ground, our own mouths condemn us: if we say that we are perfect, because we do as well as can be expected from imperfect creatures, it proves us perverse.

2. Some excuse themselves, as if they had no sin, under a notion that they are not free agents.

Our wills, say they, are governed by motives, as constantly, as invariably, as necessarily, as the heavenly bodies are moved by attraction; or as the rivers run, and a stone falls, by gravitation. Besides, God hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass. All the volitions and actions of men are according to his fixed eternal purpose; and are under the perfect guidance of his uncontrolable Providence. Consequently, we never could have done, or said, or thought, otherwise than exactly as we have. How then can we have any more moral agency than inanimate matter? or how can we be any more to blame than the winds or waves, for any irregularities?

To this formidable argument, which bids fair for excluding all possibility of praise or blameworthiness out of the whole universe; I answer,

(1.) It is not the instability, the contingence, the randomness, with which a being acts, that constitutes him a free agent; nor is it the regularity, constancy, or necessity, of the motions of inanimate bodies, that makes them not free. Were all the revolving planets and comets at full liberty from all the laws of nature, they would not be free agents, any more than they now are. Nor are intelligent creatures less free, because they are actuated regularly, and with a kind of necessity, by certain laws or principles of action; than if they had nothing, either in or out of themselves, to stimulate or restrain them. If all bodies in the material world were to be let loose from all the laws of nature, and from the governing Providence of God; and could they be supposed to move at perfect random, having nothing to direct them; still their motions would not be voluntary; and therefore, they would not be free agents. On the contrary, angels and men, though acting necessarily according to their own dispositions; though influenced always by motives; and though under the entire government of an over-ruling Providence, may yet act altogether voluntarily; and, of consequence, with the fullest conceivable freedom of moral agency. I answer,

(2.) That kind of necessity which implies an impossibility of acting otherwise than agreeably to one's own mind, is essential to the liberty of a moral agent.

If the actions of rational beings, were not necessarily according to their own dispositions, they would not be free. Such actions would not be their actions. They could have no government over them, and would deserve no praise or blame for them. If a man could act entirely contrary to his own will, or could will entirely contrary to his own disposition, what a strange kind of freedom would he have! Would any one wish for such freedom? would any one fault him