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"cannot enforce it by resisting search, or by reprisals, or other"wise, in case of a war between two nations, both being parties "to the Declaration, if either disregards it, can the other retaliate? If so, does not he also violate the conventional right "of the neutral, a party with him to the Declaration, from "whose vessel he takes his enemy's property in the way of "retaliation? Does that make a breach of treaty and casus "belli? If either belligerent violates the rule, and the neutral "power, being also party to the treaty, does not resist the act "and vindicate its right under the Declaration, does it not give "the other belligerent the right to complain, and to seek that summary and rapid redress which the exigencies of war often "require or justify?

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"The assertion of these rights and obligations, and the real or "pretended suspicion that the opposite belligerent or a neutral, "parties to the Convention, do not observe the Convention, or insist "on its observance, together with the pressure of national exigencies, “have been found sufficient, whether as causes or pretexts, to render "unavailing all former compacts for the freedom of enemy's goods "in neutral vessels.

"It must not be supposed that the new rule, if adopted, will give "neutrals entire exemption from loss and vexation. The right to "stop and search will still exist, and in its full force. The belli"gerent will still have the right to examine into the reality and "bona fides of the ostensible neutral character of the vessel, and, "for that purpose, to make all the investigation he now makes "into papers and letters; and not only into those relating to the "vessel, but also into those relating to the cargo, and to the "destination of the vessel, if likely to throw light upon the "ownership. The fraudulent use of a neutral flag and papers "by belligerents may be expected to be almost universal, and "the examinations will necessarily be strict and searching; and, "even if the vessel is clearly neutral, there is still the right of "search to ascertain whether the cargo or any of it be contra"band of war, involving an enquiry into the actual destination "of the vessel and of the cargo, which, if contraband and bound "to an enemy's port, will be pretty sure to assume an ostensible "neutral destination; and if there is probable cause to suspect "the vessel of being enemy's property, or the cargo of being "contraband. . . .”

The Declaration itself then is false in fact, false in

its statement of doctrine, of principle, and of maritime law, and, so far as Great Britain is concerned, was signed without any known sufficient authority; while so far as Russia is concerned, it was repudiated at the very moment of signing in regard to one of its most important principles-the very principle indeed which has been suggested as a sufficient reward to England for her Plenipotentiaries' adhesion.

In addition to this, no security can be felt that other nations signatory to it will faithfully observe it, if they should hold their interests to dictate the contrary course. All experience proves that it would be futile to rely on the observance of such engagements, even when they have been put in the most binding form and made in a far more deliberate and solemn manner than the hasty and unexpected Declaration of Paris. The Armed Neutrality of 1780 was formed by Russia to establish the cardinal principle of the Declaration of Paris, that the neutral flag shall protect enemy's property; but in 1793— only thirteen years later-this same Russia finding herself at war, completely threw over and repudiated the principle the Armed Neutrality had laid down, and both openly propounded and by force carried into effect, the ancient and contrary principle, that enemy's property should be captured wherever found. And in fact, since the Declaration of Paris was signed there has not been an occasion when war seemed possible between Great Britain and another European Power, and when that other Power has not openly threatened Great Britain with the revival of Privateer

ing against British commerce. Not once or twice, but repeatedly, both Russia and France have declared their intention in case of hostilities with Great Britain, to resort to and indeed mainly to rely upon

that "course" or privateering which the Declaration falsely declared to be abolished.1

1 1 The Times of 25th October, 1876, in a letter from its Prussian correspondent, dated Berlin, 24th October, published the following:

"The Moscow Gazette advises the Russian Government to "issue lettres de marque against England in case of war. As to "the prohibition of lettres de marque, agreed upon in the Paris Treaty, the Moscow Gazette disposes of the engagement by the "remark that treaties cease to be valid in war; and as it might "be urged by some that this particular treaty was concluded "for the very purpose of coming into force in war, the Gazette "adds that no treaties can be morally binding unless equally "advantageous to all parties concerned."

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

AND now as to the effect of this Declaration.

It affirmed four rules or laws of Maritime Warfare, of which two are old and true, and two new and false.

Those which are old and true are the third and fourth, which declare (1) that, "neutral merchandise, "with the exception of contraband of war, is not "liable to capture under the enemy's flag;" and (2), that "blockades, in order to be obligatory must "be effective, that is to say, maintained by a "sufficient force really to prevent access to the coast "of the enemy."

Those which are new and false are the first and second, which declare (1) that "Privateering is and "remains abolished;" (2) that "the neutral flag "covers the enemy's merchandise, with the exception "of contraband of war."

The two former rules of the Declaration can not only be admitted, but must be affirmed to be truly consonant with the Law of Nations; the two latter are as absolutely in contradiction of it and of the facts, as has already been shown; and with these two latter we are therefore alone concerned.

The effect of them upon Great Britain is, without doubt and beyond question, greater than upon any other Power; because Great Britain being the principal

maritime Power in the world, must feel more than any other the effects of any change in the laws of Maritime Warfare. And the fact that Great Britain had shown herself, before the change was made, able to resist the whole of Europe in arms, and to come victorious out of the struggle, by the very aid of the very principles now declared to be abrogated and reversed, must lead us to conclude in limine, that the change made is one fraught with especial disadvantage to her. Let us however examine the changes themselves and their effects.

PRIVATEERING AS AFFECTED BY THE DECLARATION.

I.—“ Privateering is and remains abolished "—that is to say, is abolished for Great Britain whenever she is at war with any one of the signatory States; but not when she is at war with a non-signatory State, such as Spain or the United States. The effect of this is to deprive Great Britain of the service of volunteers at sea, and to preclude her from employing in warlike operations either the vessels or the half million of able fighting men of her vast mercantile and fishing marine; for a Privateer is but a private vessel commissioned by the State. She loses thus not only an offensive but also a defensive weapon; for Privateers do not only capture enemy's vessels, but also recapture those of their own nation; and they are to the State Navy a most valuable auxiliary, without which an amount of power proportioned to the size of the mercantile marine of the State remains unemployed in time of war. She loses the power of withdrawing a considerable number of merchant-vessels from exposure to the enemy as unarmed merchantmen by turning them into offensive weapons as armed cruisers,