Error and the Growth of Experimental KnowledgeWe may learn from our mistakes, but Deborah Mayo argues that, where experimental knowledge is concerned, we haven't begun to learn enough. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge launches a vigorous critique of the subjective Bayesian view of statistical inference, and proposes Mayo's own error-statistical approach as a more robust framework for the epistemology of experiment. Mayo genuinely addresses the needs of researchers who work with statistical analysis, and simultaneously engages the basic philosophical problems of objectivity and rationality. Mayo has long argued for an account of learning from error that goes far beyond detecting logical inconsistencies. In this book, she presents her complete program for how we learn about the world by being "shrewd inquisitors of error, white gloves off." Her tough, practical approach will be important to philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, and will be welcomed by researchers in the physical, biological, and social sciences whose work depends upon statistical analysis. |
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Table des matières
| 1 | |
| 21 | |
| 57 | |
Duhem Kuhn and Bayes | 102 |
Models of Experimental Inquiry | 128 |
Severe Tests and Methodological Underdetermination | 174 |
The Experimental Basis from Which to Test Hypotheses Brownian Motion | 214 |
Severe Tests and Novel Evidence | 251 |
Hunting and Snooping Understanding the NeymanPearson Predesignationist Stance | 294 |
Why You Cannot Be Just a Little Bit Bayesian | 319 |
Why Pearson Rejected the NeymanPearson Behavioristic Philosophy and a Note on Objectivity in Statistics | 361 |
Error Statistics and Peircean Error Correction | 412 |
Toward an ErrorStatistical Philosophy of Science | 442 |
References | 465 |
Index | 481 |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
accept actual alternative appraisal argue argument from error assign Bayes's theorem Bayesian Binomial Brownian motion calculated canonical models ceteris paribus chance chapter consider correlation criticism data models deflection degrees of belief discussion distribution eclipse effect error probabilities error statistician error statistics estimate evidence example experiment experimental knowledge experimental model experimental testing factors false frequentist Giere given Howson and Urbach hypothe hypothesis H induction inquiry Kuhn Kuhn's likelihood likelihood principle mean ment methods muons Neyman non-Bayesian normal science normal testing novelty NP tests null hypothesis observed outcome paradigm parameter passed a severe Pearson Peirce Peirce's Perrin philosophy of science Popper Popperian posterior probability predesignation prediction primary prior problem question random relative frequency reliable requirement result Salmon sample scientific inference scientists severe test significance level specific standard error statistics statistical tests statistically significant stopping rule success theory tion trials true type I error use-constructed violating
Fréquemment cités
Page 47 - Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life. Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue.
Page 47 - ... will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent.
Page 47 - In a sense, to turn Sir Karl's view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science. Once a field has made that transition, critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy.
Page 46 - Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction.
Page 214 - My major aim in this was to find facts which would guarantee as much as possible the existence of atoms of definite finite size.
Page 107 - ... predicted phenomenon is not produced, not only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not tell us. The physicist may declare that this error is contained in exactly the proposition he wishes to refute, but...
Page 46 - Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience.
Page 46 - ... world, and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they see different things, and they see them in different relations one to the other. That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another.
Page 28 - ... Sir Karl's writings, but the generalization that results is historically mistaken. Furthermore, the mistake proves important, for the unambiguous form of the description misses just that characteristic of scientific practice which most nearly distinguishes the sciences from other creative pursuits. There is one sort of 'statement' or 'hypothesis' that scientists do repeatedly subject to systematic test. I have in mind statements of an individual's best guesses about the proper way to connect...
Page 22 - normal' scientist, as Kuhn describes him, is a person one ought to be sorry for. . . . The 'normal' scientist, in my view, has been taught badly.
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Informations bibliographiques
| Titre | Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series |
| Auteur | Deborah G. Mayo |
| Édition | illustrée, réimprimée |
| Éditeur | University of Chicago Press, 1996 |
| ISBN | 0226511987, 9780226511986 |
| Longueur | 493 pages |
| Exporter la citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |