No. 6.-Viscount Castlereagh to Lord W. Bentinck. (Extract.)

Chatillon, 21st February, 1814.

YOUR Despatches were delivered to me yesterday by Captain Graham, who reported to me such information as he had been enabled to collect on his route.

The point now of most importance, is to secure the effective cooperation of the Neapolitans, whose active assistance appears indispensable, to give to the Allies that rapid and commanding success which may speedily decide the fate of Italy.

I am sorry to find that Murat had, under some pretext, delayed the signature of the Treaty in its amended form; and that he still continues to shew some ménagement towards the Enemy. I should rather impute this to a desire still to push some personal views with the Allies, than to any understanding with France.

My Letter by the Messenger will have put your Lordship fully in possession of the views, on this subject, of the Prince Regent's Ministers. The British Government never liked the measure, but being taken, they are perfectly ready to act up to the spirit of the Austrian Treaty, and to acknowledge Murat, upon a Peace, on 2 conditions; 1st. That he exerts himself honourably in the War; and, 2ndly, That a reasonable Indemnity (it cannot be an equivalent) is found for the King of Sicily. I should hope, with this basis to work upon, you may not only quiet any alarms Murat may have felt, as to the nature of our Armistice, but furnish him with two very powerful incentives to come forward effectually. In doing so, he will facilitate all his own views, and by assisting in the Indemnities to the King of Sicily, he may secure his own title to Naples.

I have forwarded your Lordship's Military Despatch to London. The exertion you have made in assembling the Corps is highly creditable, and its presence must largely contribute to the successful issue of the Campaign.

I shall be anxious to receive Reports of your Lordship's progress :

if sent to Marshal Bellegarde's Head Quarters, Sir Robert Wilson will forward them to me. The Armistice, as now arranged by your Lordship, is perfectly satisfactory. Lieut-Gen. Lord W. Bentinck.

CASTLEREAGH.

No. 6.--Lord William Bentinck to Marshal Bellegarde. [Transmitted officially by Lord W. Bentinck to Visct. Castlereagh.] (Extract.) Verona, 25th March, 1814. It is now necessary to consider what has been the conduct of

Murat.

1. Has he fulfilled his Treaty with Austria, the object, and sole object, of which was his immediate co-operation?

2. Was not this immediate co-operation, if he were sincere, as necessary to his own safety, as to the success of the Common Cause? 3. But has he not rather acted, as if his apprehensions were not of Buonaparte, but of the Allies ?

4. Was it not the natural feeling and policy of a Deserter from the cause of Buonaparte, to throw himself with all his weight into the scale, and be the most forward in the contest? He could have no hope of escaping the effects of the vengeance of Buonaparte, if successful.

5. In what manner has he occupied the different parts of Italy evacuated by the French? Has not his occupation had more the air of permanent than of temporary possession?

6. Is it not the language of all his Officers, and of himself, that all Italy should be united, and that he should be the Chief of Italian Independence ?

7. Is not this sentiment in exact accord with that of Buonaparte? 8. What mean his great endeavours to retain in his service the French Officers, who, he knows, will never serve against their Countrymen ?

9. What means his continual friendly intercourse with all the French Authorities,-with Fouché,-with the Advanced Posts,— and latterly, with peculiar activity, direct with the Head Quarters of the Viceroy, without the knowledge and participation of the Austrian Minister?

10. Finally, is there any Man in Italy,—is there any Man or Officer in the Austrian Army south of the Po,-has your Excellency, or have I myself, any confidence whatever in his sincerity? Do not all believe, that his sole object is to gain time;-that he is making and will make use of every pretext to do nothing, until the issue of the present struggle shall have been decided, when he will throw himself into the strongest side.

H. E. Field Marshal Bellegarde.

W. C. BENTINCK.

No. 7.-Visct. Castlereagh to Lord W. Bentinck.-Dijon, 30th Mar. 1814. [See Page 314.]

No. 8.-Viscount Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck. MY LORD,

Dijon, 3d April, 1814. As several Couriers have lately been intercepted, I send you my Dispatch of the 30th ultimo, in Duplicate, also the Instruction therein referred to from Earl Bathurst.

Your Lordship will perceive, that the object of the former is to accelerate those results which may enable you to execute the important object to which the latter is directed, namely, the concentration of the whole of the British disposable Force, employed on the side of the Peninsula and Mediterranean, under the command of FieldMarshal the Marquis of Wellington, in the heart of France.

In order to bring the Italian Campaign to a speedy and successful result, it is essential that your Lordship should consider your Force merely as an Auxiliary Corps, and that you should accommodate yourself, as far as the safety of your Army will permit, to the views and wishes of the Austrian Commander in Chief. It is from bim your Lordship will best learn what are the intentions of the Allies, including those of your own Government; and should your Lordship find any difficulty in the execution of this service, arising from what may appear to your Lordship to be a departure, on the part of Marshal Murat or any other Member of the Confederacy, from the true principle of the Alliance, your Lordship will refer the matter for the opinion of the Austrian Commander, avoiding as much as possible any separate discussions, which might interfere with the general union and necessary subordination, which ought to pervade the whole.

Whilst the Court of Naples was hostile, and the security of Sicily by no means assured, if my recollection is not incorrect, your Lordship's Military Instructions restricted your operations to such parts of the Coast of Italy as might facilitate the return of your Force to Sicily, should its presence be required.

The subsequent change of circumstances, recognized clearly in the Dispatch I now send you from Earl Bathurst, seems to assign no other limits to your Lordship's movements than such as the military expediency of the moment may suggest; and, subject to the better judg ment of your Lordship and Marshal Bellegarde, I have no hesitation in stating it as my opinion, that, both with a view of giving complete development to the active operations of the Allies against the Viceroy, as well as of securing to the Austrian Commander that weight and preponderance which it is desirable he should possess, your Lordship's Corps can be in no manner so advantageously employed as by incorporating it at once with the Neapolitan Army, and thus creating such a Force, on the Right Bank of the Po, as may assume the offensive, without reference to distant and complicated combinations.

This course of operations will also best and soonest approach your Lordship to those Passes into the South of France, which may

enable you, either alone, or probably in conjunction with a part of Marshal Bellegarde's Army, to effectuate your junction with Lord Wellington, in obedience to the Order herewith sent.

I am sorry to observe that alarms and suspicions have latterly prevailed so as to obstruct all useful concert and co-operation: faults, perhaps, exist on both sides; but we should not despair of correcting them. Many of them may arise out of former combinations,—many out of jealousies, not unnaturally resulting from the character and peeuliar relations of the Parties, and some no doubt from a spirit of encroachment and political speculation on the part of Murat; but the latter must be vigorously repressed, and, I should hope, are much exaggerated; for were it otherwise, it is not for military concert, but for war amongst ourselves we should prepare; and unless the Parties can place themselves towards each other in not only friendly, but confidential relations, they will create the evil which they desire to avoid.

On the question that has arisen between your Lordship and Marshal Murat, with respect to Tuscany, I am unable, in the absence of any Report from yourself, to form a judgment; nor do I find that Prince Metternich has any knowledge whatever of the Convention stated to have been signed by Count Niepperg with your Lordship.

I can easily conceive, without aiming at its ultimate appropriation to himself, that Murat will cling as long as he can to the enjoyment of the resources of so rich a Country. There are sufficient indications, however, that he has not been exempt at times from larger views upon Tuscany, and indeed upon the whole of Italy, South of the Po. He now, however, professes his readiness to deliver over the Country to its former Sovereign, and this seems the only effectual and just remedy for the existing evil; as its resources will then be administered by those most nearly interested in preserving them, and both the British and Neapolitan Troops will have their respective Lines of military operation secured to them, by a friendly Sovereign, in whose Territories they will find themselves equally received as Allies. I trust before this reaches your Lordship, that measures will have been taken by Marshal Bellegarde, in consequence of Orders sent him to this effect, for establishing the authority of the Grand Duke in Tuscany.

But this is not the only evil, which it is essential should be made to cease, and to which your Lordship's attention should be directed. It is in vain to hope for any useful concert from Murat whilst a system of menace prevails, (and as he may suppose, with the countenance of the British Gouvernment) with respect to his title to Naples. The Order of the Day, issued by the Hereditary Prince of Sicily, as it appears, to Troops actually proceeding upon service under your Lordship's orders, is in itself sufficient to blast all the prospects of advantage to the Common Cause, which the Allies pro

posed to themselves from forming a connection with Murat. I request your Lordship will immediately report to me, for the information of the Prince Regent and His Allies, the circumstances under which this Document was issued, and whether your Lordship has adopted any, and what steps, for disavowing it on the part of your Court.

Whether the King of Sicily will or will not relinquish his Rights to the Crown of Naples, it is altogether within his competence, as an independant Sovereign, to decide; but it is impossible for His Majesty to pursue by his own means these rights, to the contradiction and prejudice of the views of the Allies, and to retain any claim upon them for support of any sort, either as to the recovery of his Neapolitan Dominions, or a Possession in lieu thereof. It is true His Britannic Majesty has not yet contracted any Engagements with the existing Ruler of Naples, and that from delicacy and attention to the interest of an Ally, the King of Sicily, the British Government has, without any strict obligation to do so, declared their intention to be, that their Treaty with Murat should marcher de front, with a suit. able arrangement for the King of Sicily; but if His Sicilian Majesty shall think fit to counteract them in this their generous and friendly policy, having by their Armistice admitted the principle of the Austrian Treaty with Murat,-they will feel themselves released from all further forbearance, and will find themselves compelled to enter into an immediate Treaty with Murat, in order to protect the Common Cause against the disunion which the injudicious conduct of the Court of Palermo must inevitably produce.

Your Lordship will lose no time in making an Official Communication to the Sicilian Government to the above effect; and I am to signify to your Lordship the Prince Regent's pleasure, should you find that the employment of His Sicilian Majesty's Troops on the Continent, necessarily leads to impressions incompatible with the existing system of the Allies in Italy, that your Lordship do in that case take immediate measures for sending them back to Sicily; an extremity to which, however, under proper explanations with the Sicilian Government, and also with Murat, I flatter myself your Lordship will not find it necessary to have recourse.

There is one subject further, upon which I deem it necessary to say a few words;-not that I entertain the smallest doubts as to your Lordship's own conduct being regulated in strict conformity to the present system of your Government;-but as your Lordship, very properly, and under Orders from home, gave great countenance at a former period to the only system which, previous to the revival of the Continent, could afford a prospect of shaking the power of France, it it is the more necessary, now that a different and better order of things has arisen, to guard against any act or expression which might