of the proposals made in a memorandum * submitted to the Commander-in-Chief in February 1901 on behalf of the Manchester Tactical Society, a body of volunteer and regular officers formed in 1881 for purposes of study. The new regulation for attendance at camp was much attacked in the London newspapers, for it was inconvenient to many of the London Volunteer corps. The evidence published by the Royal Commission proves that the Manchester Tactical Society represented the Volunteer force better than the London newspapers; for, out of some 200 corps which attend camp every year, twentythree attend for a fortnight; and, of the remainder, 124 would be prepared to extend their time beyond a week if the money grants were increased. The outcry led to the appointment of an advisory board of volunteer commanding officers, and of similar boards for the Militia and Yeomanry. But the indifference of the Government to the special needs of the Militia and Volunteers is shown by the fact that, even before the Royal Commission reported, the advisory boards were dissolved.

To postpone a difficulty is not to solve it, but rather to insure that it will reappear in an aggravated form. The appointment of a Royal Commission is of all dilatory proceedings the one most liable to produce this kind of recoil on the Government that has recourse to it; for a Royal Commission, deriving its authority from the King, and being unpaid, is absolutely independent. The only means of regulating its action consists in the judicious definition of the task assigned to it-a definition which is embodied in the royal warrant. Now the terms of reference, in the present case, ran as follows:

'To inquire into the organisation, numbers, and terms of service of our Militia and Volunteer forces; and to report whether any, and, if any, what changes are required in order to secure that these forces shall be maintained in a condition of military efficiency and at an adequate strength.'

Nothing could be clearer, nothing more stringent, than the purpose here set forth; the Commission was to ascertain how to secure for the forces which it was to investigate both military efficiency and adequate strength.

* Appendices, p. 124.

Military efficiency means fitness for war; and adequate strength in a military body must be a strength sufficient to fulfil the duty which that body has to discharge. Thus the Commission was, by the terms of its reference, at once confronted with one of the most difficult and at the same time most vital problems of national defence. The Cabinet, which is responsible for the reference, had not sufficiently considered the meaning of its words, and was astonished and embarrassed by their consequences. The Marquis of Lansdowne said in the House of Lords on June 27, 1904, when the Report of the Commission was discussed:

'If our reference to the Commission was obscure, we greatly regret it; but we certainly understood that they were invited to report rather on the question of the measures which were necessary in order to maintain the popularity and the efficiency of the auxiliary forces than upon those much deeper and more complicated problems which have been touched upon during the debate and in parts of the Report.'

The Commission was bound, not by the unexpressed intentions of the Government, but by the terms of the reference, which are free from the obscurity lamented by Lord Lansdowne. There is, however, no sign that the Duke of Norfolk and his colleagues plunged into profound speculations, or tried to usurp the functions of a Committee of Defence. They received from the War Office a paper setting forth the requirements, as understood by the Secretary of State. But the questions put to witnesses in the elucidation of this paper revealed a startling divergence of opinion between the War Office and the Admiralty. The Commissioners sought enlightenment from the Admiralty. They were ready to offer themselves for conversion to the ideas of the blue-water school.' But the Government interfered by refusing to allow the Admiralty officers to give evidence, and by referring the Commission to the Committee of Defence. That body proposed to the Commission two hypotheses to be taken as the working basis of the enquiry, but was careful to avoid committing itself, except hypothetically, to either of them. The Commission, as requested, took these hypotheses to work from, but expressed no opinion upon them, and explicitly disclaimed responsibility for

them. 'It will be seen' (they say) 'that we had not the means of reaching, in any scientific manner, an independent conclusion as to the adequate strength to be provided.'* But, after the publication of the Report, the Government, by the mouth of Lord Lansdowne, reproached the Commission in the following terms:

'With regard to the further recommendation, that compulsion in some form or another should be resorted to, I think we must bear in mind that that recommendation was made upon a twofold hypothesis-in the first place, on the assumption that the country was denuded of regular troops, and, in the next place, that the Government had come to the conclusion that invasion, as distinguished from a mere raid, was within the bounds of possibility. Those are two very extensive hypotheses; and they are not the class of problem which, in our estimation, had been referred to the Commission.' †

Lord Lansdowne's hearers would hardly gather that the twofold hypothesis was the work, not of the Royal Commission, but of the Cabinet Committee of Imperial Defence.

The terms of the reference to the Commission, the estimate given by the War Office of the force required, and the correspondence with the Committee of Imperial Defence, led the Commission to the following conclusions, which are the key to the Report:

An effective force-in other words, an army-of the strength proposed to us, can be required only to meet an invasion. Either an invasion is possible or it is not. If not, no military force is required for home defence; and our enquiry could hardly serve any practical purpose. But, if invasion is possible, it can be undertaken only by one of the great European Powers which possess forces highly trained and ready to move in large numbers at the shortest notice. The Militia exist chiefly, and the Volunteers solely, for the purpose of resisting a possible invasion of the United Kingdom, which would be attempted only by a first-rate army. This purpose will not be fulfilled merely by a brave or creditable, but unsuccessful, resistance; it requires the defeat of the enemy. The standard of efficiency to be aimed at is therefore not a matter of opinion; the conditions of war

* Report, § 22.

tTimes,' June 28, 1904.

and of the battlefield must be met, and no lower standard can be laid down.'

The Commissioners proceed, in section III of their Report, 'to measure by the standard of war conditions the Militia and Volunteer forces as they are.' As regards the Militia, the estimate is that the drill and training undergone by this force are insufficient to enable it at short notice to oppose trained troops in the field; that the average militia battalion would not be fit for fighting against a serious enemy until after several months' embodiment, though the militia garrison artillery would not require very much extra training to be ready for its war work. The Commissioners further find that the training of the militia officer is inadequate to enable him properly to lead troops. The Militia is imperfectly organised and equipped for war. Thus the Commission was 'forced to the conclusion that the Militia, in its existing condition, is unfit to take the field for the defence of this country.'

As regards the Volunteer force, the Commission observes that its training is hampered by difficulties as to both time and space; that the efficiency of the units varies greatly, and that, on the whole, neither the musketry nor the tactical training of the rank and file reaches the standard attained by the troops of a continental army. The organisation for war is imperfect. The Report dwells at some length on the qualifications of the officers of the Volunteer force :

"That which distinguishes an army from a number of armed men is the cohesion which enables it to act as a single organism. The men are given their places in a framework which is formed by the officers and non-commissioned officers; and this framework is the skeleton by which the whole is supported and made one.'

The volunteer officers receive less systematic training than the officers of any regular army, and are not, as a rule, so well trained as the officers of the Swiss Militia. The consequence is that

'they are of very unequal quality. Many of them have given themselves an excellent military education, and would be a valuable element in any army; the majority, however, have neither the theoretical knowledge nor the practical skill in

the handling of troops which would make them competent instructors in peace or leaders in war. This inequality of attainment prevents the Volunteer force from acquiring the cohesion needed for war.'

The Commissioners were agreed in the conclusion

'that the Volunteer force, in view of the unequal military education of the officers, the limited training of the men, and the defects of equipment and organisation, is not qualified to take the field against a regular army.'

The Report next examines the measures by which the efficiency of the two forces may be increased. For the Militia it recommends a six months' continuous training in the first year, followed in the second, third, and fourth years by a six weeks' training, and by a fortnight's training in each of the four subsequent years of an eight years' engagement. It further recommends the transference of the commanding officers and a portion of the company officers to the permanent staff, and the permanent organisation of the Militia into brigades and divisions.

Thus far the Commissioners seem to have been unanimous. Of those who wrote dissentient reports, Colonels Satterthwaite and Dalmahoy expressly record their concurrence with the majority up to this point; and Sir Ralph Knox recommends for the Militia a scheme not materially differing from that of the majority report. But as regards the means of improving the Volunteers, the Commissioners were not agreed. The two volunteer colonels, while rejecting the principle of universal service, held that the measures which seemed to them necessary could not be carried out without either pay to the men or compulsion; and they based their recommendations on the acceptance of the principle of compulsion, which is also favoured by Sir R. Knox. The majority of the Commission thought it their duty to ascertain by what changes the Volunteer force 'could be brought to the highest degree of military efficiency consistent with its existing constitution'-in other words, to find out how, without compulsion, the Volunteer force can be improved.

The evidence given was found to repeat certain points with such persistency that, when these points were classified and put together, they formed the outlines of a