and a quite distinct thing. The former we understand and believe. The latter we neither understand nor believe; for we know nothing at all of it.

Pyrrho said, Theophilus, suppose that God should tell you, that a thing is so and so; will you not believe it, unless he acquaint you with the mode or manner of it; how it is effected or how it exists; or how it is reconcileable with all the other truths you are acquainted with? Theophilus answered, as far as God reveals anything, so far he explains or discovers it. And whatever God says, I am very ready to assent to it, for that very reason, that God hath said it. Because whatever God says must be true. But I must understand what is said, as well as be satisfied that the discovery came from God, before I can believe it as a divine revelation. If God reveals anything with its mode and manner, and all its relations and circumstances, then I believe that, with its mode and manner, and all its relations and circumstances. If God reveals part of a thing, as far as God reveals it so far I believe it. Secret things belong to the Lord our God. They are his peculiar, and we have nothing to do with them. They cannot, therefore, be the objects of our knowledge or of our faith.

Whatever contradicts a known truth, or is irreconcileable with it, that cannot possibly be part of a divine revelation. As long as I think it inconsistent with any known truth, so long I must either reject it, or suppose that I have not yet the true meaning of

the words in which it is delivered.

Where our ideas

are clear, there our faith may be clear. Where our ideas are confused or obscure, there our faith must necessarily be confused or obscure. Where our ideas are adequate, there our faith may be adequate. Where our ideas are short or partial, there our faith must be partial, or extended only to part of a thing. But where we have no ideas at all, there we can have no faith at all.

Pyrrho smiled and said, surely, Theophilus, you are a strange man; and I could hardly have believed it of you. What, will no objection stand before you? Nor anything prove to you, that men may believe what they cannot understand? I have one objection more, which so modest a man, as you are, will scarce know what to say to. And that is, that fathers as well as moderns, ductors and bishops, philosophers and divines, eminently learned, great and good men, have contended for believing things which we do not understand. And surely, such wise and good men could never all be mistaken; neither can it be supposed that they would have contended for this opinion, unless there had been truth and reason in it.

You yourself have acknowledged that Tertullian said of one article, "I believe it, because it is impossible." And that bishop Beveridge has assigned it as a reason for his believing another article of faith, "That he could not conceive or understand it.”*

* See the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion, &c. p. 132, &c.

Theophilus observed that, in mentioning such particulars, he had made his remarks upon them; which plainly showed he greatly disapproved of such obnoxious expressions. But Pyrrho said, that to show that those mentioned were not singular, he could produce other celebrated persons to confirm their opinion.

St Austin often cites what he had read in the LXX, and vulgar Latin,-If you do not believe you shall not understand,―to infer from it, that we must believe divine truths, before we understand them. And the crowd of Popish writers follow him, to authorise a blind and implicit faith. Theophilus replied, if St Austin had had an exact translation of that passage, he had only read, unless you believe, [viz. that the kingdoms of Assyria and Israel shall shortly be destroyed,] you shall not be established.*

Pyrrho owned that those he had already quoted were, indeed, divines; and he observed, that the author of Christianity as old as the Creation had insinuated, that "it was their interest to confound men's understandings, and to prevent all inquiry; and therefore they have craftily invented the notion of believing things above reason." But there are others who have contended for the same thing.

You have quoted Lord Bacon as saying something very like it. And there have been others as well as divines, persons of excellent judgment, and great

See an Essay for a new Translation of the Bible, p. 63.

The Reasonableness of the Christian Religion, &c. p. 132.

friends to free inquiry, and who were never suspected of a design to impose upon and confound men's understandings, that yet have thought it just to admit the notion of things above reason. I shall mention only two more, both of them laymen of eminent note for their attempts to inform and improve men's understandings, and promote useful knowledge, Mr Boyle and Mr Locke.

That excellent philosopher, the great and good Mr Boyle, has written a treatise, which he calls a Discourse of Things above Reason; inquiring whether a philosopher should admit there are any such. To which are annexed some advices about judging of things said to transcend reason.

In that discourse, he ranks things above reason, under three heads. The first is, of things whose nature is such, that we are not able distinctly and adequately to comprehend it. Such is the Almighty God, whose perfections are so boundless, and his nature so singular, that it is presumption to imagine, that such finite beings, as our souls, can frame full and adequate ideas of them. The second sort consists of things, which have properties and ways of operation, which we cannot intelligibly account for or explain by any thing we already know. The third sort is, of such things that involve some notion or proposition, that we see not how to reconcile with some other thing, that we are persuaded to be truth; and which are incumbered with difficulties and objections, that cannot directly and satisfactorily be resolved. All these he

calls privileged things; because they surpass our reason; at least so far that they are not to be judged of, by the same measures and rules, by which men are wont to judge of ordinary things. Accordingly, he puts it among the advices he gives in judging of things that transcend our reason, that a matter of fact or other truth, about privileged things, being proved by arguments competent in their kind, we ought not to deny it, merely because we cannot explain, or perhaps so much as conceive the modus of it; or because we know not how to reconcile it to something that is true; or because it is liable to ill consequences, and is incumbered with great inconveniences. All these things he admirably illustrates and supports by a variety of instances well urged from Philosophy and Natural Theology; and concludes, with observing, that we must not expect as to privileged things, and the propositions that may be formed about them, to resolve all difficulties and answer all objections; since we can never directly answer those, which require for their solution a perfect comprehension of what is infinite.

Here Pyrrho made a pause; but Theophilus desired him to proceed with what he had to allege from Mr Locke; and then he would make remarks upon all his examples at once.

Well then, said Pyrrho, the other person I refer to is the acute and sagacious Mr Locke, whom I suppose the author of Christianity as old as the Creation would not reckon among those designing men, whose interest it is to confound men's understandings. He